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ABSTRACT 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the relationship between the protection of foreign investors’ 
investments under international investment law and the domestic law of host states. Two questions arise in 
this connection. First, is the promotion and protection of investments comprised in investment agreements 
compatible with states’ domestic law? Second, public policies of host states may appear to be in 
contradiction with an increased international security of investments. When such a conflict is challenged by 
foreign investors, what are the consequences for both parties? In general, investments are transactions that 
are private in nature, whose aim is to generate a positive rate of return. Investments can have pervasive 
consequences on countries’ welfare, including, for example, the consequences on sustainable development; 
the use and protection of natural resources; and employment, to name a few. It is the role of the 
governments to balance these sometimes conflicting public and private interests. As of today, it seems that 
the regime established according to investment treaties does not strike an appropriate balance between the 
various interests concerned. After a brief look at the legal framework protecting foreign investments, the 
conflict areas between investment treaty provisions and domestic public policies of host states are explored 
through an empirical analysis of some case studies and recent arbitrations. Finally, this dissertation holds 
that, at a substantive level, investment law is a part of international law. Thus it must be consistent with its 
norms and it has to be interpreted in accordance with customary rules of treaty interpretation. The 
dissertation concludes by suggesting the creation of a state-investor relationship and advocates, in part, the 
establishment of development objectives in investment treaties as well as the inclusion of rights and 
obligations for all parties involved.  
 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, table of cases, 
bibliography, list of abbreviations and footnotes) comprises approximately (33121) 
words. 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
 
Private international investment is an increasingly important factor in the world 
economy. Both developed and developing countries benefit from a more effective 
allocation of resources and the integration of markets. Moreover, for a number of 
developing countries foreign investment represents a growing part of their external 
source of capital and technology. As of today, foreign direct investment (FDI)1 brings not 
only capital and technology to the host country, but also management expertise and 
access to new markets. Therefore, FDI is widely recognised as a major contributor to 
growth and development.  
The establishment of businesses funded by foreign investors is one of the main 
factors promoting international capital movement. Thus, foreign direct investment had 
reached a bulk of US$1300 billion in 2000, which corresponds to an impressive increase 
since 1970, when this activity represented only US$12 billion.2 
 If a long-term analysis shows a strong development of international investments, 
the recent period is however marked by a reorientation: in 2003 the total of foreign direct 
investment had dropped by more than half compared with 2000, to only US$559 billion.3 
Such a backward step is without a doubt partly temporary,4 or even a sign of maturity 
from the world economy. Nevertheless, the reduction seems at the very least abrupt and 
indicates certain fragility in international investment. 
A strong legal protection of foreign investments, preferably under consistent 
international rules, needs to exist. This is particularly so in a situation of economic 
instability, where investors seek stable management conditions.  
                                                 
1
 According to the terminology of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is of a certain term and aims to establish control of a corporate body. The 
UNCTAD is a permanent intergovernmental body and is the principal organ of the United Nations General 
Assembly dealing with trade, investment and development. It was established in 1964. See: 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2068 (last accessed 21 November 2008). 
2
 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2004. The Shift Towards Services (United Nations Publications, New 
York and Geneva 2004) 367.  
3
 Ibid. 
4
 WTO International Trade Statistics 2003 (WTO Publications, Geneva, 2003) 167. The WTO stated a 
simultaneous decrease of world exports, their value went from 125% in 2000 to 120% in 2001 (100%: in 
1995). 
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 Therefore, it appears useful that a system protecting foreign investments has 
grown up thanks to international investment law. Indeed, host states are bound by 
international rules aiming to protect foreign investors from political risks. A good 
application of international rules can generally be ensured, at the initiative of investors, 
by international arbitration tribunals. Thus, the state finds its action subject to external 
control. Furthermore, the scope of international investment law has moved in a 
favourable way for investors because at this stage, it includes the full range of public 
action.  
If this fact is reassuring for investors and would even be conducive to stabilising 
investments flows, such strong protection can however have an equivocal impact on the 
definition and administration of public policies of host states.5 Indeed, from now on, all 
the normative, administrative and judicial activities affecting the interests of foreign 
investors as well as those involving their capital seem to concern international investment 
law.  
Aspects of both public and private international law define international 
investment law. On the one hand, states are subject to the rules of this unique class of 
international public law. On the other hand, the legal framework governing foreign 
investments benefits multinational enterprises which are subjects of the private 
international sphere.6 
International investment agreements (IIAs)7  are usually identified as having a 
positive impact on development. Theoretically, the possibility of increased investment 
disputes brought about by the expanding network of IIAs may motivate host countries to 
improve domestic administrative practices and laws in order to avoid future disputes. 
                                                 
5
 Charles Oman Quelles Politiques pour Attirer les Investissements Directs Etrangers? – Une Etude de la 
Concurrence entre Gouvernements (OCDE, Paris, 2000) 103. 
6
 Omar E García-Bolívar International Law on Foreign Investment at a Crossroads: the Need to Reform 
(2008). Paper available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=omar_garcia_bolivar (last accessed 
04 February 2009) 1. 
7
 The term International Investment Agreement (IIA) refers to all bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties as well as to all other agreements containing comparable provisions signed between two or more 
countries to protect investments made by investors of one country (home state) in the other country (host 
state). 
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Thus and according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD):8 
IIAs are important not only because of their potential international impact in terms of 
attracting foreign direct investment or sending positive signals to foreign investors. Equally 
significant are promotion of transparency, due process and strict application of the rule of 
law, which are the best means of avoiding investment disputes. 
 
One of the critical challenges when negotiating IIAs is to try to achieve a balance 
between the need to provide a predictable and transparent FDI policy framework in 
which private firms can pursue their corporate objectives on the one hand, and the need to 
retain the national policy space that is needed to implement national development 
objectives on the other.9 
 Nevertheless, how a given IIA strikes this balance is often unclear on its face, and 
conflicts arise out of the growing application of IIA provisions on how they might 
regulate governments’ policy making ability. The regulatory discretion of the sovereign 
states is challenged more and more by foreign investors. Indeed, an increasing number of 
investor-state cases contain new regulatory measures as the basis of their claim. The 
increased protection provided by states to foreign investors, including provisions to 
protect against the ratification of discriminatory measures, for example, will certainly 
affect the discretion of host governments to regulate in the public interest.10 
Yet, according to the good governance perspective, it is important for every state 
hosting foreign investments to be aware of the international legal risks linked to the 
public policies implemented in its territory. Political and administrative authorities of 
host states must draw lessons not only about their room for maneuverability (which is 
therefore reduced) but also about the possible need to reorganise their relationship with 
investors. 
                                                 
8
 UNCTAD Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rule Making (United Nations 
Publications, New York and Geneva, 2008) 93. 
9
 J Weber Existing Proposals on Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Agreements and Practices Towards 
Codes of Conduct on TNCs and Governments With Respect to FDI in UNCTAD-Civil Society Dialogue on 
Selected Development Issues Being Addressed by the United-nations System (Papers Prepared in Support of 
the Issues Discussed, Geneva, 2002) 31. 
10
 Howard Mann Investment Agreements and the Regulatory State: Can Exceptions Clauses Create a Safe 
Haven for Governments? (Issues in International Investment Law, Background Papers for the Developing 
Country Investment Negotiator’s Forum, IISD, Singapore, 2007) 2. 
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In order to highlight the relationship between the protection of foreign 
investments under international investment law and the domestic law of host states, the 
present study adopts a combined methodology. This dissertation is primarily based on a 
legal analysis in order to identify the current state of international investment law. This 
analysis will be confirmed by empirical factors from the socio-economic situation. The 
study also takes into consideration political and administrative analysis in order to 
underline the key issues linked to the evolution in the security of international foreign 
investments in public management. Therefore, the dissertation is divided into three 
chapters that treat distinct but interrelated issues. 
Chapter II explores the nature and the evolution of international investment law. 
The methodological study described above will allow the assessment of the meaning and 
scope of rules existing under the security of international investments. The purpose of 
this chapter is not to provide an in-depth evolution and historical background of foreign 
investment law, but it aims to briefly highlight the legal framework protecting foreign 
investments. 
In Chapter III, the dissertation will attempt to identify the impact of increased 
protection of foreign investments through investment treaties on the regulatory power of 
host states and, in particular, on the public policies that are most affected. The potential 
conflicts between investment treaty provisions and domestic public policies of host states 
are explored through an empirical analysis of some case studies and recent arbitrations. 
While the benefits of international investment are generally recognised, there are 
concerns that these provisions are offering more and more guarantees to international 
investors at the expense of the domestic regulatory power of the state. On the one hand, 
the independent management of domestic economic affairs is desired; on the other, it is 
recognised that a large measure of participation in the international economy serves the 
general welfare. This dilemma lies at the heart of the tensions which sometimes arise 
between international investors and the governments of both host countries and investor 
countries. 
Finally, Chapter IV will reflect on the foregoing analysis in preparation for 
analysing a new way to manage relationships between host states and investors. It is 
indeed essential to promote mutual understanding be
 9
and governments on the fundamental issues affecting their relationship. In addition, this 
dissertation advocates for the establishment of development objectives in investment 
treaties as well as the inclusion of rights and obligations for all parties involved. 
Accordingly and on the basis of the model of an International Agreement on Investment 
for Sustainable Development developed by the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD),11 this dissertation supports the recognition of a right to the security 
of foreign investments which could be included in the preamble of international 
investment agreements under the condition to respect some fundamental international 
rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) at: http://www.iisd.org/ (last accessed 11 May 
2009). 
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CHAPTER II A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF SECURITY OF FOREIGN INVESTORS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
 
 The singularity of the current IIA network results from an ancient historical 
evolution. 12  Former to the twentieth century, diplomatic protection and claims 
commissions were the primary means to enforce international standards of foreign 
investment and investor protection.13 The globalisation of the world economy introduced 
some limits to the diplomatic model of protection. In particular debates around the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment to be accorded to foreign 
investors and investments arose between capital exporting and importing states.14 In the 
post Second World War (WWII) era, the contemporary investment treaty framework was 
developed. The historical development of international investment law is a fundamental 
step to take into consideration in order to better understand contemporary controversies in 
this area of law. 
While in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, international investment litigation 
remained (because of the absence of legal tools) relatively uncommon, the massive 
emergence of bilateral conventions for the protection and promotion of investments since 
then has resulted in a massive increase in arbitrations. Whereas the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) registered only 25 cases from 1972 to 
1990, 60 cases were resolved under the auspices of the Centre in the following fourteen 
years. As of September 2009, 122 cases were pending.15 The ICSID is an autonomous 
international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States16 with over one hundred and forty 
member states. The Convention sets out the mandate, organisation and core function of 
ICSID. The primary purpose of ICSID is to provide facilities for the conciliation and 
                                                 
12
 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Standards of 
Treatments (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 1. 
13
 Ibid, 8-10. 
14
 Ibid, 11-18. 
15
 Statistics published by the ICSID. Available at: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last 
accessed 25 September 2009). 
16
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between Sates and Nationals of other States 
(ICSID Convention) (signed 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159. ICSID 
See http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last accessed 8 September 2008). 
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arbitration of international investment disputes. The ICSID Convention is a multilateral 
treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (the World Bank).   
The cumulative total of all known cases brought under bilateral, regional17 or 
plurilateral18 agreements that contain investment clauses or IIAs, is now 298.19 Well over 
half (92) of the 160 known claims were filed within the past three years. Virtually none 
of them were initiated by governments. In view of this recent surge, it is not surprising 
that the majority of investment treaty arbitration proceedings are still pending before 
tribunals. Due to the fact that many claims are still pending, some uncertainty surrounds 
the meaning of key treaty provisions. “All of this means that governments need to be very 
careful when negotiating investment treaties”,20  said Karl P Sauvant, Director of the 
UNCTAD Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development. 
Such a massive rise in the number of disputes under the ICSID indicates the 
increased importance of international investment law. It is obvious that foreign investors 
would not have resorted to arbitration tribunals in such increasing numbers if they had 
not thought that they would gain justice. Thus, almost exclusively, private parties have 
used international tribunals as an alternative. Host states, in general, prefer to leave the 
disputes to their own domestic justice system. 
 We might say that international investment law has evolved favourably from a 
foreign investor perspective. Furthermore, investment law norms, at least the way in 
which they are sanctioned by the courts, have received recognition and enforcement by 
host states. 
This Chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the origins and 
developments of international treaty law from the 1920s, setting the background for the 
                                                 
17
 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States (NAFTA) (adopted 17 December 1992, 
entered into force 1 January 1994) 32 ILM 289. 
18
 For example, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (signed 17 December 1964, entered into force 16 April 
1998) 2080 UNTS 100. 
19
 Statistics published by the ICSID, above n 14. International investment disputes can also arise from 
contracts between investors and governments. A number of such disputes are, or have been, before ICSID 
but are not included in its data. 
20
 UNCTAD International Investment Disputes on the Rise – Occasional Note 
(UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/ITT/2004/2, 29 November 2004) 1. 
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second part, which discusses the role played by arbitral tribunals in shaping the 
interpretation of the main standards of treatment of foreign investors. The last part deals 
with the current structure of IIAs and how an increased protection of investors is now to 
be observed. 
A A Slow Evolution of Law: An Increasing Security with Uncertain Limits 
 
1 A basic protection of investment and investors 
 
The corpus of principles and rules of international investment law was, at the 
beginning of its development, relatively limited in scale and range. Indeed, from the 
1920s, the courts called to rule on the first cases could, in the absence of texts, only use 
general principles of international law and in particular those concerning the law of aliens 
which were necessarily unsuited to such an application, as well as not being very 
concrete or well-developed. Under the terms of these principles every sovereign had to 
grant adequate treatment and protection to the subjects of its counterparts. Concerning 
foreign investments, the courts could only draw the principle that the host state is bound 
to give up any measure pointedly discriminatory and outrageous.21  
Indeed, in the Neer case, Mr Neer (a United States national) was working in a 
mine in Mexico when he was killed by a group of armed men.22 When the US presented a 
claim against Mexico, the claim was rejected on the grounds that the tribunal could not 
prove that the lack of conscientiousness on the part of Mexican authorities to apprehend 
the perpetrators was the reason for the death of Mr Neer.23    
International disputes of the 1920s and 1930s reflect a certain tension between 
national autonomy and international controls. In his separate opinion, the judge Fred K 
Nielsen emphasised this tension. Nielsen clearly pointed out that in international law the 
scope of sovereign rights in relation to matters subject to domestic regulations must 
conform to the constraints imposed by such sovereignty.24 He also explains that a failure 
                                                 
21
 LFH Neer & Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States US-Mexico Claims Commission (1926) IV 
RIAA 60,  paras 4 and 5. 
22
 LFH Neer & Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, above n 21, para 1. 
23
 Ibid, paras 5 and 6. 
24
 LFH Neer & Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, above n 21, Separate Opinion, 64. 
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to do so can result in the recognition of international delinquency.25 A need for such 
requirement is no less favourable than that required by the regulations of international 
law.26 Such a scenario is sustained by the notion that international law requires states to 
treat ‘aliens’ in accordance with minimum international standards.27  This is undeniably 
supported by the Neer claim, resolved by the Mexican-United States General Claims 
Commission:28     
 
The propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international 
standards… the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international 
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to 
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency. 
 
Following WWII, states allowed international investment law to develop only 
slowly and partially. There was no adoption of a multilateral investment instrument or a 
bilateral development of rules specific to investment, as was the case for trade.29 Thus, 
old agreements from 19th century known as “FCN” (Friendship-Commerce-Navigation) 
agreements are still in effect today or agreements concluded on the same model of the 
years 1950-1960,30 which had during long years to be used as a substitute with more 
adapted rules. Typically, such agreements, in addition to the reciprocal obligation of 
"perpetual peace and friendship", simply required that private activities be accorded 
                                                 
25
 Ibid, 64. 
26
 Ibid, 64. 
27
 Surya P Subedi International Investment Law Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon, 2008) 118. 
28
 LFH Neer & Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, above n 21,  para 4. 
29
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (30 October 1947) 55 UNTS 194. The GATT is only a 
component of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which was meant to be created under the Havana 
Charter but the Charter failed to come into effect. The Charter should have contained rules relating to 
international investment. Only the GATT remained by temporary application from 1947 and until 1995 
when it has been inserted to the World Trade Organisation System by the Marrakech agreements: General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Negotiations: Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (WTO Agreement) (signed 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 
January 1995) 33 ILM 1126.  
30
 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua (21 January 
1956) (quoted in: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1986] ICJ Rep 392); Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and 
Consular Rights between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran (15 August 1955) 8 
UST 899 (entered into force 16 June 1957) (‘the Treaty’) (quoted in: Oil Platforms Case (Islamic Republic 
of Iran v United States of America) [2003] (Merits)  ICJ Rep 161). 
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most-favoured nation treatment, as well as including an obligation to treat foreigners and 
their property in accordance with national law.31  
The General Assembly of the United Nations finally took the initiative to state a 
certain number of more concrete principles for the protection of foreign investments. In 
particular, the General Assembly voted with a very large majority that any use by states 
of the right of expropriation had to be exercised with due respect to certain conditions of 
international law, and in particular that an expropriation be followed by appropriate 
compensation:32 
Nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised as overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the owner 
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the 
State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with 
international law. In any case, where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be 
exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, 
settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international 
adjudication. 
  
The General Assembly does not have, under the United Nations Charter,33  a 
capacity to promulgate binding international law.34  Certain authors could see in the 
statement of states’ right of expropriation an expression of opinio juris, one of the 
components of customary international law35 which binds the states even in the absence 
                                                 
31
 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Liberia (21 
October 1962) Article III. 
32
 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (14 December 1962) 
A/RES/1803, para 4. Certain authors support that the term “suitable” is equivalent to a compensation 
standard less demanding than the Hull Rule which stated a “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation, 
for example Andrew Guzman Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Why LDCs Sign 
Treaties That Hurt Them (Jean Monnet Centre Working Papers, New York University School of Law, 
1997). Available at: http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-12.html (last accessed September 
2008). The US government (the author of the Hull Rule) has on the contrary stated the similarity of the two 
standards, e.g. the official declaration quoted in: Louis Henkin, Richard Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans 
Smit International Law: Cases and Materials (3ed, West Publishing, St Paul, 1988) 1063. 
33
 Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
59 Stat 1031: TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153. 
34
 Article 10 of the Charter grants the Assembly a power of advice. 
35
 See article 38 para 1 b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) (signed 26 June 
1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat 1055; TS No 993. Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org (accessed 23 September 2008). 
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of a convention.36 In association with the compounding practice that the states followed, 
the resolution was considered by pre-eminent observers as reflecting the state of law.37 In 
addition, the Resolution stated that the state had control over the admission of foreign 
investment by means of authorisation, restriction or prohibition. 38  However, once 
granted, national and international law shall govern foreign investment.39 
Following the admission of the recently independent states to the United Nations, 
the 1970s saw a collapse of the consensus concerning the international customary 
protection of foreign investments.40 These states, taking advantage of their majority at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, voted several resolutions under the terms of 
which no international legal provision could limit their right to expropriate.41  
It would have meant, in practice, that the compensation for expropriation could be 
fixed according to criteria chosen by host states, or even totally eliminated. From a legal 
point of view, the pre-existent customary international rule that compelled recently 
independent states to adequately compensate the investor could not however be rejected 
in this way. Customary international law is binding on states even if it was developed 
before a state came into existence and the state did not contribute to its development. 
Indeed, given the conservative nature of international law, the absence of opinio juris in 
some states, as UN resolutions might suggest, does not lead to the immediate collapse to 
a customary rule. 42  In addition, the resolutions at issue were voted against by 
industrialised states. Therefore, the resolutions could probably not found the suppression 
                                                 
36
 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Libyan Arab Republic (1978) (Award) 17 ILM 3 (Ad Hoc Arb) para 
27. See Dominique Carreau and Patrick Juilliard Droit International Economique (3ed, Dalloz, Paris 2007) 
1163. 
37
 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co v Libyan Arab Republic, above n 36, para 90.  
38
 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, above n 25, para 2. 
See Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. Standards of 
Treatments (Kluwer Law International, 2009) Chapter 1, paras 1.20 and 26. 
39
 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, above n 38, para 3. 
40
 S K B Asante “Droit International et Investissements” in Bedjaoui Mohammed Droit International. Bilan 
et Perspectives (Pedone/UNESCO, Paris, 1991) 711-719. 
41
 For example see UNGA Resolution 3201 (S-VI) Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (1 May 1974) A/RES/3201; UNGA Resolution 3202 (S-VI) Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Order (1 May 1974) A/RES/3202 and UNGA Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) Containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1974) 
A/RES/29/3281, Article 2, para 2. 
42
 Kuweit Government v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) (1982) (Award) 21 ILM 976 (Ad 
Hoc Arb) 1024, para 90. See also Bruno Simma and Alfred Verdross Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie 
und Praxis (3ed, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1984) paras 572 and 574.  
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of the rule, at least where North-South relationships were concerned since the rule had 
been established by the international community as a whole.43 Regardless of the legal 
position, however, at this stage the security of foreign investments seemed in practice to 
be seriously threatened.  
 
2 Development of a large BITs’ network 
   
However, economic pragmatism ended up by prevailing on both sides44 and made 
it possible to develop a network of bilateral conventions for the protection and promotion 
of investments. Developing countries recognised the benefit of attracting foreign 
investments by the creation of a protective body of rules. There are about 2500 
conventions in force today45 undoubtedly binding states’ parties.46 The signature of the 
first BIT (Bilateral International Treaty) between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 did not 
lead to a boom of BITs (despite the embracement by European states of the BIT model). 
Until 1991, only 400 BITs had been concluded worldwide. 47  The number of BITs 
concluded increased significantly during the 1990s. By contrast with the year 1996, when 
about 1000 BITs existed worldwide, today more than 2500 BITs have been brought into 
life, linking more than 170 countries. An academic author has characterised the 
exponential rise of BITs as a “treatification of international investment law.”48 BITs are 
generally signed between a developed and a developing country. Such treaties generally 
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bear common characteristics. BITs indicate the rights granted to investors, such as the 
scope of application to investments and investors, the kind of investments that are 
covered, when coverage begins and ends, and in case of infringement how dispute 
settlement works.49 Bilateral conventions which form a dense network today contributed 
to the appearance not only of one real protection on the field but also of a homogeneous 
theory of this area of law, and this in particular because of recurrent standards of 
treatment: 
 
An obligation of fair and equitable treatment (FET) of investment;  
 
An obligation to guarantee a full protection and security of investment;  
 
A clause providing for national treatment of the investment and the foreign 
investor; 
 
A clause providing most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment to the investment;  
 
A prohibition on the expropriation of the investment without prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. 
            
Despite the high number of conventions it is possible to mention these common 
normative provisions contained in bilateral investments treaties because they are based on 
a “model” of convention widely used in negotiations by capital-exporting states and 
elaborated by the OECD.50 However certain differences remain. In particular, bilateral 
conventions promulgated by the United-States provide that the obligation of national 
treatment applies from the pre-establishment phase onwards. 
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According to a literal reading of these provisions, however, their scope remains 
limited. The terminology is indeed vague and thus creates a margin of interpretation. 
Nevertheless the intention of the parties at the time of the negotiations was a restricted 
meaning of the protective clauses for the investor51 and the principles of interpretation of 
international law would require any such special meaning to be taken into account at the 
time of the interpretation of the texts. 52  Moreover, in traditional international law, 
restrictions on sovereignty are not presumed.53 An “uncertainty” exists only when all 
methods of interpretation allowed by international law have been previously exhausted. 
However, pro-states treaty interpretations remain very few in comparison with pro-
investor ones. Recent case law regarding the concept of fair and equitable treatment 
suggests that state action affecting investors’ legitimate expectations and legal and 
business stability constitutes a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. The 
analysis about legitimate expectations is notably reflected in the awards in CMS v 
Argentine Republic 54  and Técnicas Medioambientos Tecmed, SA (Tecmed) v United 
Mexican States.55 The tribunal in CMS based its definition of the standard on the stability 
of the legal and business environment.56 In particular it stressed that “fair and equitable 
treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability.” 57  In the light of the 
requirement of stability and predictability, the tribunal in Tecmed held that fair and 
equitable treatment meant that the host state would:58  
act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations 
with the foreign investor, so that [the investor] may know beforehand any and all rules 
and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investments and 
comply with such regulations. 
 
In finding Argentina in breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, the 
CMS tribunal also observed that “the measures that are complained of did in fact entirely 
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transform and alter the legal and business environment under which the investment was 
decided and made.” 59  The tribunal acknowledged that a legal framework could 
legitimately evolve to adapt to changing circumstances, but went on to state that the 
framework could not be “dispensed with altogether when specific commitments to the 
contrary have been made.”60  
In these cases, unfair and inequitable treatment is equated with any state conduct 
that departs from the expectations investors may derive from conditions at the time they 
make their investment. One could argue that because arbitral tribunals held in both cases 
that a measure taken by the host state was not consistent with the fair and equitable 
treatment, an allegation of the breach of this standard of treatment regarding legitimate 
expectations of investors will always be found. However, consistency reflected in the 
jurisprudence of arbitral awards does not necessary mean there exits a definitive rule of 
law that any claim made in this respect will be found in favour of foreign investors. It 
must also be considered that when the tribunal applies the above principle of legitimate 
expectations to inconsistent international obligations, it might result in accentuating the 
application of this notion to non-investment obligations at the time of the establishment 
of the investment in the host country.61 
The BIT phenomenon, designed to ease barriers to FDI and generate more FDI 
inflows, has proved to be successful in that purpose: the acceleration of the number of 
ratified BITs and the increase in the rates of FDI converge.62 From only less than $100 
billion in 1980, the world’s stock of FDI now stands at almost $1600 billion.63  In 
addition, foreign investors benefit from legal rights granted by the adoption of BITs. 
Despite the restriction it might impose on the sovereign sphere of control of host 
governments, states keep signing BITs because developed countries consider BITs as a 
way to protect the interests of their multinational enterprises (MNEs) whereas developing 
countries see BITs as necessary to attract private capital from abroad. Therefore, 
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governments from both developed and developing countries seek economic liberalism by 
freeing the international flow of goods, services and investment.64 
Some tribunals find BITs to be instruments sustaining investor protection. In this 
light, a tribunal in Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic held:65  
The Tribunal shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and 
preamble. It is a treaty “to protect” and “to promote” investments… It is to create 
favourable conditions for investments and to stimulate private initiative. 
 
Hence, uncertainties as to how to resolve unclear treaty provisions should be resolved in 
favour of foreign investors. 66  Nevertheless recent decisions have rejected such an 
approach in providing states more margins of appreciation67 as well as considering that:68  
A balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the 
State’s responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the 
development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and 
its continuing flow’, thus rejecting a one-sided interpretation either in favour of foreign 
investors or in favour of host states. 
 
In a dispute were it was respondent, the United States argued that:69  
a doctrine of restrictive interpretation should be applied in investor states disputes. In 
other words, wherever there is any ambiguity in clauses granting jurisdiction over 
disputes concerning states and private persons, such ambiguity is always to be resolved in 
favour of maintaining state sovereignty. 
 
The obvious and growing role of BITs in the world political economy is therefore 
acknowledged. The areas of both monetary policy and trade are coordinated through 
coherent multilateral regimes. In contrast, the governance of FDI is highly decentralised. 
A limited regulatory framework on investment has been developed in the form of the 
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Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)70  and General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)71 under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).72   
 
(a)  The collapse of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment  
 
Failed negotiations among the member states of the OECD from 1995 to 1998 
towards the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)73 need to be studied. It is not 
the goal of the present dissertation to comment extensively on this particular issue of 
international investment law. Reference is made only for the purpose of identifying the 
issues at stake and what conclusions can be drawn from such a failure. 
In May 1995, the negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
between the 29 Member states of the OECD started. One can identify three factors 
leading to the decision to study the possibility of such an agreement: a rapid growth in 
investment flows by the early 1990s, the trend towards unilateral liberalisation of 
national restrictions on foreign investment, and the absence of a comprehensive 
international investment framework agreement.74 The analysis of the failure of the MAI 
is based on the last version of the agreement that was produced on 24 April 1998 and 
released by the OECD on the Internet.75 The draft contains 12 chapters and encompasses 
145 pages. Despite its length, the majority of clauses in the draft text deal with 
recognised areas in investment liberalisation, investment protection and dispute 
settlement. 76  The main aim of this agreement was to establish high standards for 
investment protection of a worldwide application. Such a high investment protection was 
to be reached among other measures by a broad definition of investor and investment in 
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order to ensure a large scope of protection. 77  Additionally, minimum standards of 
treatment such as national treatment 78  and most-favoured-nation treatment 79  were 
provided in order to achieve non-discrimination among national and foreign investors in 
combination with adequate compensation.80  
The basic idea behind the MAI was that FDI is an engine for economic growth, 
and by the same token, “growth in FDI has been underpinned by widespread 
liberalisation”.81 The MAI treaty thus had to:82 
 
set clear, consistent, and transparent rules on liberalisation and investor protection, 
with dispute settlement, thereby underpinning the continued removal of barriers to 
market access and encouraging economic growth.  
 
An examination of the key components of the MAI is necessary. Principles and 
standards contained in the MAI were to a large extent based on the provisions of the 
NAFTA agreement. Hence, regarding the scope of application, the MAI adopted an asset- 
based definition of investment.83 A standard of non-discrimination between foreign and 
domestic investor84 as well as the application of national and MFN treatment to both the 
pre- and post-admission phases of the investment process85 would have been imposed on 
its member states. Chapter IV of the draft MAI set out the investment protection 
provisions. In the event of expropriation of their investments, host states were required to 
provide foreign investors with compensation.86 The strong provisions on expropriation 
would cover direct as well as indirect expropriations. The category of indirect 
expropriation includes governmental measures “having equivalent effect” to a direct 
expropriation.87 No guidance is given within the MAI provisions as to whether normal 
regulatory changes that negatively affect the value of an investment would be covered 
within the concept of an indirect expropriation. Member states are required to provide fair 
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and equitable treatment and full protection and security while ensuring a minimum 
standard of treatment of that required by international law.88 Lastly, investor-state dispute 
settlement procedures are provided for.89  
In 1997, the negotiations had to be extended for one year. Despite the extension, a 
suspension of six months occurred in April 1998, at the yearly meeting of the OECD 
Council, in order to “consult with civil society” and “take stock of the national 
situation.”90 In October 1998, before negotiations could be resumed, France officially 
pulled out of the negotiations and was followed by many other countries that appeared to 
withdraw their support for the MAI. During the autumn of 1998 negotiations faded away. 
Relatively low levels of transparency were reflected during the MAI negotiations. 
Three possible reasons can be identified. First of all, the interests of capital-exporting 
countries might have been promoted by the scope and application of the MAI to the 
detriment of capital-importing countries.91 Moreover, the OECD forum did not reflect a 
large variety of actors and states. As a matter of fact, capital-exporting states are the main 
OECD members.92 Finally, the negotiations process exposed tensions as to whether the 
MAI should reflect a United States or more modest European model.93 Thus, the failure 
of the MAI demonstrates that “there is no common ground concerning certain far-
reaching standards of investment protection.”94  
 
(b) Increased participation of NGOs in investment arbitrations 
 
Insufficient participatory opportunities for Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) must also be pointed out. The main reason for this was that the MAI negotiations 
had largely been conducted confidentially between the representatives of the 29 member 
states of the OECD. A large variety of NGOs became extremely concerned once the 
negotiating text was released on the Internet. Soon, a bewildering number of around 600 
NGOs involving 70 countries were involved in the MAI campaign. The draft treaty was 
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prominently opposed not only by environmental groups but also a wide variety of other 
groups, including domestic trade unions, international human rights groups (such as 
Amnesty International), development bodies (such as Community Aid Abroad), 95 
religious organisations, churches and nationalist political parties. One of the NGOs’ main 
concerns against the treaty draft was its similarity to investor protection and dispute 
settlement provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the associated impact on the 
regulatory autonomy of host states. For example, NGOs were concerned that the 
protection against indirect expropriation would impede the normal regulatory measures of 
host states:96 
 
Perhaps the greatest environmental threat the MAI poses is that the investor-state 
dispute procedure, any new laws to protect the environment, wilderness, species or 
natural resource protection could be considered a form of expropriation and foreign 
investors would have the right to sue for compensation before an international tribunal 
made up of unelected trade bureaucrats. 
 
As a result, the exclusion of the NGOs from the MAI negotiations process was 
“the basis of the misperceptions and the mistrust that led them into a campaign to kill the 
MAI.”97 Following the MAI episode, there is no doubt that future major international 
negotiations will require to be conducted within a public policy network.98 Discussions 
on international investment agreements require full and effective participation of all 
groups within civil society, in order to hear their views and benefit from their 
experiences. The process of international investment rule-making (including the 
negotiation of IIAs) could benefit from the input of NGOs.99 
NGOs are particularly concerned with the perceived impact of trade and 
investment agreements on issues as diverse as the environment, labour standards and 
human rights. In this vein, NGOs have increasingly sought and attained limited rights to 
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submit amicus curiae briefs100  within the dispute settlement process of the WTO,101 
Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement102 and ICSID.103 
The NGOs’ claim of a lack of transparency in NAFTA arbitrations led two 
NAFTA Tribunals to admit that they have the authority to accept amici curiae briefs. 
Such cases involve questions of great public importance like environmental issues.104 
In the Methanex Case,105 the arbitral tribunal received a petition from several 
NGOs106 requesting that they be allowed: first, to file amicus briefs; second, to review the 
written pleadings of the parties; third, to make written and oral submissions, and fourth, 
to participate in the oral hearings. As a starting point, the arbitral tribunal noted that 
Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules107 empowers a tribunal to conduct the 
proceedings between the parties in such manner as it deems appropriate, provided that the 
parties are treated on the basis of equality. The Tribunal concluded that by virtue of 
Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, it had the power to accept amicus 
curiae submissions in writing.108 However, the tribunal considered that it had no power to 
grant NGOs requests to receive materials generated within the arbitration or to attend oral 
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hearings of the arbitration.109 In UPS v Canada, the arbitral tribunal relied on Methanex 
to a great extent. It also determined that it had the power to allow third party participation 
through the submission of amicus briefs.110 
The role of NGOs and the policy of transparency in investment disputes are still 
being developed. The extent to which NGOs should be allowed to participate is the 
subject of an important public debate.111 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
address that question in detail. 
B A Security Based on International Arbitration Tribunals 
 
The prescriptive reality is however more complex. This is mainly due to the 
original mechanism of disputes settlement which basically differentiates international 
investment law from other branches of international law. Bilateral investment treaties 
indeed generally open recourse to arbitration for a mixed dispute between the host state 
on the one hand and the foreign investor on the other. These tribunals are generally 
composed of three arbitrators, including two respectively selected by the parties to the 
convention and the third - the President - selected by mutual agreement of the two pre-
indicated arbitrators. Such a composition is a pledge of neutrality for the arbitration 
tribunal. Thus, the foreign investor avoids the recourse to the domestic justice system 
which is one branch of the public authority of the opposing party and thus subjected to 
some doubt as to its impartiality in an investment dispute (even if one must assume the 
good faith of the national judge).  
Moreover, international courts composed of private adjudicators are subject to 
very demanding effectiveness and discretion restrictions to which domestic justice cannot 
provide an equivalent in all countries. The tribunal of international arbitration is 
subjected to an extremely favourable procedural framework for the investor because its 
mandate is strictly limited to the investment dispute and it cannot therefore extend its 
jurisdiction to the cases pending against the investor, which can be the case under 
domestic law.  
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Lastly, the arbitral tribunal obtains its mandate from international law and not 
under the national law of the host state, preventing the host state from changing the rules 
of the game according to suit themselves. This does not necessarily imply that the 
tribunal exclusively applies international law. On the contrary, the parties can agree on 
the application of the domestic law of the state-party or of any other national law. In 
principle the tribunal will, however, be held to control the choice of law selected by the 
parties in relation to the international legal order. In the respect of the law applicable to 
the substance of investment treaty arbitration,112 the principal provision setting out the 
choice of law is Article 42(1) ICSID Convention: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be   
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law 
of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) 
and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 
 
Therefore according to the first sentence of this provision, the international 
investment treaty might provide its own choice of law rule. In the absence of an express 
agreement on applicable law, the tribunal will consider the respective roles of the law of 
the host state and of international law. The issue around the applicable law constitutes an 
important question in ICSID arbitration and has raised debate around its scope of 
meaning and interpretation.113 
 The iterative application of conventional texts by arbitration tribunals has 
inevitably resulted in a normative development of international investment law (and in 
particular of the principles or standards of protection of investments at the international 
level). Admittedly, this is a legitimate phenomenon in international law. Indeed, Article 
38(1)(d). of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 114  recognises that the 
interpretation of international law takes into account, inter alia, judicial decisions. The 
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characteristic of international investment law lies however in the scope of the obligations 
drawn by the tribunals from the relatively vague conventional texts. 
It is therefore necessary to provide a definition of essential terms in international 
investment law. These key-definitions are indicative and reflect a common practice in a 
number of bilateral treaties as interpreted by arbitral tribunals. States may, however, in 
certain cases, have chosen other definitions.115 
 
Investment:116 a foreign corporation engages in several types of foreign investments. FDI 
is an investment by a firm in a foreign country to acquire real assets such as plant, 
equipment, and real estate or land with the aim of maintaining control over their 
management. FDI involves both ownership and control of the foreign entity by the 
corporation. A firm which controls operations or owns assets in more than one country is 
called a multinational corporation (MNC). MNCs are owned in their home countries and 
invest in host countries. Portfolio investment, in contrast, involves acquisition of foreign 
securities such as shares and bonds by firms without them acquiring any direct control 
over the management of the foreign entity.117 
 
Fair and equitable treatment (FET):118 this treatment is analysed without reference to the 
treatment of other goods or people. It thus constitutes an absolute measure. Thus national 
treatment alone is insufficient because international law confers a level of protection 
which exceeds the one provided by the host state to its nationals. Thus a denial of 
justice119 would be, for example, incompatible with a fair and equitable treatment.  
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Full protection and security of investment:120 the host state has the obligation to take any 
useful and necessary measure to protect the investment from destruction and despoliation 
even by third parties. An overall inaction of authorities of a host state in view of an 
imminent danger for the investment or the absence of judicial proceedings in case of 
breaches of the law and perpetrated against the investment would be incompatible with 
the obligation of full protection and security. 
 
National treatment:121 this requires from host states to grant foreign investors and their 
investments treatment that is no less favourable than the treatment granted to domestic 
investors and investments. 
 
Most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN): 122  usually incorporated in IIAs as a general 
requirement. The standard requires that foreign investors and their investments enjoy 
treatment that is no less favourable than the treatment accorded to investors of any third 
states and their investment by the host countries. 
 
Expropriation:123 it is the unilateral withdrawal by public authorities of the host state of 
the right of ownership of an investor or rights related to it (for example: possession, right 
of exploitation) unless it is a repressive reaction to the illicit behaviour of the investor. 
Therefore the taking of foreign investors’ property is prohibited except if it is done for a 
public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, with payment of compensation, and, in 
many cases, with due process of law. According to the Hull Formula124 of 1936 named 
after the Secretary of State of the United States who applied this principle for the first 
time, international law requires “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation for the 
expropriation of foreign investments. First, compensation for expropriation must be 
prompt, meaning that it must be paid as soon as expropriation is carried out or within a 
reasonable time; secondly, it must be adequate as it should correspond to the monetary 
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value of the expropriated goods calculated during a period of time immediately preceding 
the advertisement of expropriation; and finally, it should be effective as the compensation 
must be put into payment in transferable and exchangeable form. Nowadays, the Hull 
formula is often used by a certain developed countries and accepted as part of customary 
international law.  
C The New Content of International Investment Law 
 
 Investors have enjoyed, for approximately twenty years, an increasing security of 
their assets located abroad. It is not that tribunals began making radically new 
interpretations, and awards against states remain very few in international arbitration. 
 
1 Fair and equitable treatment standard to security against administrative 
vagueness   
 
From the general obligation of fair and equitable treatment seen above, the 
tribunal in the Metalclad v Mexico case could draw a true obligation of transparency of 
the administration of investments by the host state. 125  It was considered to be 
incompatible with this obligation that the local district refused a building permit to the 
investor whereas the federal state had previously stated that the operation was possible.126  
The tribunal in Tecmed extended this approach. Regarding the fair and equitable 
treatment, the tribunal held that the investor could legitimately expect that the framework 
and rules applicable to the investment would be identified, and that the behaviour of the 
state would remain coherent and stable relative to the framework thus established.127  
 
2 Prohibition of the arbitrary to protection against the evolution of the law 
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Any change of the domestic legal system after the establishment of an investment 
could potentially breach international investment law. Indeed, it was determined in the 
Metalclad case that the transformation of a foreign investment site into a natural reserve, 
thus making the facilities of the investor unusable, amounted to a violation of fair and 
equitable treatment.128 This award even suggests a primacy of the protection of foreign 
investments over environmental concerns; at the same time, however, the investment 
treaty states that measures for the protection of the environment, taken in order to ensure 
environmental issues, are lawful. Article 1114 of NAFTA reads:  
 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, 
or enforcing any measure, otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental concerns. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the tribunal found that the obligation of fair and equitable treatment 
had been violated by the host state Mexico in this particular case. 129  The Tribunal 
interpreted the minimum standard of treatment to require, inter alia, “transparency” of all 
relevant legal requirements at all stages of the investment process.130 The Tribunal found 
that Mexican legislation contained no clear rule as to whether a municipal construction 
permit was required or not; furthermore, there was no established practice or procedure as 
to the manner of handling applications for a municipal construction permit. The Tribunal 
found a failure to ensure transparency on the part of Mexico.131 However, during the 
review of the decision of the Tribunal by the British Columbia Supreme Court,132 the 
Court found that there were no transparency requirements in NAFTA Chapter 11. 
According to the Court, applying transparency obligations to Chapter 11 disputes would 
be tantamount to creating new obligations, which would clearly be outside the 
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jurisdiction of the Tribunal.133 Thus, the Court held that the Tribunal decided on a matter 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.134  
Moreover, a true security against the evolutions of the law has developed from the 
obligation to compensate indirect expropriations. This appears in the jurisprudence since 
the 1980s when the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal judged that the effect and not the 
subject-matter of an act were decisive in reference to the obligation to compensate for 
expropriation.135  
From the obligation to compensate expropriations, even indirect ones, tribunals 
also find an obligation to compensate creeping expropriations. 136  A creeping 
expropriation is characterised by a series of acts from public institutions having the 
cumulative consequence of the expropriation of the investment, even though none of the 
acts taken individually fulfil this condition.137 In the award in Generation Ukraine Inc v 
Ukraine, creeping expropriation was defined as follows:138 
 
Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation with a distinctive temporal 
quality in the sense that it encapsulates the situation whereby a series of acts 
attributable to a State over a period of time culminate in the expropriatory taking of 
such property.  
 
It has been decided that any concealed and iterative interference leading to the 
removal of a part or the entirety of the property rights from the investor, that are 
legitimately possessed, must be considered as tantamount to expropriation even though 
the interference does not occur to the benefit of the host state.139  
Nevertheless, one might query the scope of this jurisprudence, knowing that 
economic operators frequently come up against combinations of fragmented regulations 
in their activities. Each regulation has, in itself, a raison d’être as part of the public 
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interest. One thinks in particular of the way the tax rules and regulations of different 
economic sectors can combine to cause prejudicial results for certain companies. The 
same applies to the field of consumer law. Regulatory effects of this kind can lead to 
indirect expropriation. Generally, expropriation refers to the use of any measures by the 
host country government which result in the transfer of property rights from the private 
owner to the government itself or a third party for any purpose. Normally, the term 
“expropriation” falls into two main categories: direct expropriation and indirect 
expropriation or any measure tantamount to expropriation.140 A direct taking of property 
may occur in many ways and forms, such as the nationalisation, confiscation, and 
dispossession of the assets of an investor, as long as it involves directly taking control of 
the rights belonging rightfully to the private owners. 141  On the other hand, indirect 
expropriation, or any measures tantamount to expropriation, does not involve a seizure of 
control over the rights of the investor. Rather, it may involve a government measure that 
may “interfere” with the usage of the property rights instead of taking direct control of 
the assets.142 International arbitral tribunals have determined on several occasions, that 
indirect expropriation could cover a wide range of policy measures, such as the 
imposition of an arbitrarily disproportionate tax rate, the forced sale of equity, and the 
denial of access to legal materials.  
The line between the concept of indirect expropriation and non-compensable 
regulatory governmental measures has not been systematically articulated. However, a 
close examination of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that, in broad terms, there are 
some criteria that tribunals have used to distinguish these concepts: the degree of 
interference with the property right, the character of governmental measures and the 
interference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed expectations.143 The 
purpose and proportionality of the regulatory measures have also often been taken into 
account in order to determine whether compensation was due. Thus a number of cases 
have been determined on the basis of recognition that governments have the right to 
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protect, through non-discriminatory actions, inter alia, the environment, human health 
and safety, market integrity and social policies without providing compensation for any 
incidental deprivation of foreign owned property. The quest for a generally-applicable 
distinction between the concept of indirect expropriation and a regulatory measure will be 
assessed in more detail in the analysis below.144 
In any event, conventional practice has today acknowledged this evolution and the 
recent bilateral treaties of protection and promotion of investments include a clause about 
this phenomenon, which entitles the investor to compensation.145 
A final step in the development of jurisprudence concerning indirect 
expropriations has been recently reached when several tribunals found, in particular 
cases, an obligation to compensate for the prejudicial effects of goods or administrative 
Acts of general scope, when they only secondarily harm the use of the property of a 
foreign investor (“regulatory expropriations”). 146  The scope of this interpretation is 
potentially important. Contrary to the traditionalist view,147 tribunals refuse to consider 
the implementation in good faith of police powers of the state as an excuse for such an 
interference with the rights of foreign investors.148 
Admittedly, the doctrine149 and certain awards150  consider that the states must 
continue to have freedom over domestic administration, especially in order to attain 
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objectives internationally recognised as of public interest (such as the environment and 
health) as well as to obtain necessary financing (through taxation) even where this results 
in unfavourable consequences for foreign investments. Every enterprise in the territory of 
its home state will be subject to such restrictions and it is difficult to argue that an 
investor should be better protected abroad than in his own country.151 One award has 
detailed the broad acceptance of regulatory expropriations in finding that the loss suffered 
by an investment caused by an environmental measure, like every measure of general 
interest, would lead to an obligation to compensate only if the measure were not 
proportional to a legitimate objective.152 
The severity of the economic impact caused by a government action is now 
considered in most international decisions as an important element in determining 
whether it rises to the level of expropriation requiring compensation. 153  Therefore, 
compensation was denied when the action of the host state did not remove essentially all 
or most of the economic value of the property of the foreign investor. On the contrary, a 
“substantial” interference in the fundamental rights of ownership will most likely 
constitute an expropriation entitled to compensation.154 Nevertheless, arbitral tribunals 
can today sanction host states even for the implementation of a simple tax regulation of 
general application since it would reflect a confiscatory nature, thus making the process 
of investment unprofitable.155  
Nevertheless, a nuance was introduced in the Feldman Case. The claimant alleged 
that the application of certain tax measures from the Mexican government that denied an 
American cigarette producer certain tax rebates constituted a breach of article 1110 of 
NAFTA. The Tribunal declined to find an expropriation although it acknowledged that 
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the investor effectively lost the ability to export cigarettes and any profits derived as a 
result of the tax regulation. The Tribunal found that since exports played only a minor 
role in the overall business undertakings of the American company, the particular 
government tax measure did not substantially affect the interests of the private 
investor.156 Hence, general taxation is not always expropriatory. 
Moreover, certain recent investment treaties now include clauses prohibiting 
excessive taxation of their nationals in the territory of the other state party.157 This raises 
the issue of the distinction between appropriate and excessive taxation on which arbitral 
tribunals will have to decide. 
 
3 An international contract law to an international legal security of contracts 
 
Although the terminology might suggest that the concept of expropriation is 
limited to the unilateral withdrawal of a good of which the prejudiced party was owner, 
tribunals also recognise an obligation to compensate expropriation for debts, hitherto seen 
as simple contractual rights.158  Yet, arbitration case law discovered the existence of 
"owners of a contractual right" while sanctioning, as an expropriation, a domestic 
measure of public interest which would make impossible the execution of the contract 
concluded with a private party.159  
In this context, a new category of jurisprudence is interested in state contracts 
which are directly concluded between the private investor and host state as private 
parties. It implies that the arbitrary or confiscatory non-performance by the state party 
can lead to an obligation to compensate the investor under international law. Indeed an 
award of an ICSID tribunal was annulled for the reason that it failed to analyse a 
violation of a state contract under international law while at the same time the contract 
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expressly indicated that questions of interpretation of the contract should be decided by a 
domestic judge.160 
This jurisprudence is surprising not because the state is bound to compensate (the 
state would be also bound by virtue of the domestic contractual law of that state in case 
of violation) but because the investor can appeal to international arbitration tribunals to 
this effect with international law in support. Therefore, the foreign investor appears to be 
better protected than if he had contracted with a private party or with its home country. 
Admittedly, arbitration tribunals have indicated that the violation of a contractual clause 
by the host state does not automatically constitute a violation of international law, and in 
particular of the bilateral investment treaty. 161  Nevertheless, a contractual breach of 
domestic law can be called upon today by the investor with the support of a claim for 
compensation, for example, for arbitrary treatment.162 Today, it is easier to maintain that 
an act can be impugned at both domestic and international law. Thus, a certain measure 
taken by the host state may constitute a breach of contract as well as a violation of 
international law.163 Nevertheless, the two categories of violations require the application 
of two different standards to determine whether one, or the other, or both have been 
breached.164 Therefore, “A state may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and 
vice versa…”165 “…whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has 
been a breach of contract are different questions.”166 Christoph Schreuer explains that 
contract claims may fall under the competence of an arbitration tribunal if one of the 
following three conditions is met:167 
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- The claimant asserts that the breach of the contract amounts to a violation of one or 
several of the BIT’s substantive standards (for example fair and equitable treatment, 
full protection and security, restrictions on the right to expropriate) 
- The arbitration clause in the BIT is not restricted to violations of the BIT’s 
substantive provisions but covers disputes with respect to investments in general, 
- The BIT contains an “umbrella clause” converting a breach of contract into a 
violation of the BIT. 
 
“Umbrella clauses," which stipulate in very general terms that the state must 
respect its commitments towards the investor, have the potential to raise to the level of 
international law any contractual violation,168 since the interpretation of this clause shows 
that the parties at the convention indeed wished the clause to catch purely contractual 
disagreements.169  
Thus, the prescriptive context has evolved in a direction favourable to the foreign 
investor, and this even if all the examples of interpretation quoted above are not 
necessarily shared by all judges called to rule in comparable cases. However, there is an 
important probability that in future, tribunals may rule in one single direction while being 
based on many solid precedents. Still, it is necessary in order to estimate the impact of the 
evolutions, to question whether international investment law has some practical 
significance.  
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CHAPTER III STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF CONTRADICTORY IMPERATIVES 
IN PUBLIC LAW OF HOST STATES IN RELATION TO THE SECURITY 
EXPECTATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTORS 
 
The evolution, nature and context of international investment law have been 
outlined. 170  It has been established that host states are confronted with new legal 
constraints with respect to foreign investors, constraints which they cannot elude in 
practice. However this is not the only reason that host states are faced with a dilemma 
today. Host countries cannot conform to the requirements of international law without 
facing difficulties. 
Nevertheless, the requirements of international investment law can have 
significant impacts on the implementation of public policies within a host state. In most 
cases, the economic role of the state has shifted from a direct public ownership of private 
operators to a regulatory authority by means of taxing, environmental, labour and social 
instruments. 171  The regulatory function of the state and how it impacts on foreign 
investment has become a central issue with regard to the development of international 
law and policy. 172  An increasing body of investor-state disputes where the issue of 
balancing investors’ rights with host countries’ policy space and regulatory flexibility has 
been challenged under trade and investment treaties illustrates this important evolution.173 
A study from the WTO and the World Bank has determined the necessity of an 
appropriate and effective domestic regulatory environment in order to ensure the 
achievement of medium and long-term benefits of trade and investment liberalisation.174 
The policy space of host countries is often described as the space where states have a 
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sovereign right to regulate within their territory, while at the same time the state must 
abide by rules of both international and national law.175 The lawfulness of a host state’s 
regulations and policies is more frequently being challenged by investors.176 Investor 
protections contained in investment agreements have the capacity to limit to a large 
extent the policy space of host governments and their abilities to regulate in the public 
interest.177   
Accordingly, the invocation by investors of provisions regarding public policies 
and contained in some investment treaties has developed an international jurisprudence 
about regulatory-related investment disputes. In the light of such international 
jurisprudence, the disputes arising out of such conflicted interests will be discussed. 
Then, it will be specified at what point either the security of investments, or the 
concerned regulatory public policies, are likely to adapt. A newly-worded treaty appears 
to be necessary in order to respond to the conflicts previously identified.  This step will 
finally make it possible to highlight the heart of the problem. 
 
A Public Policies Jeopardised by the International Security of Investments 
 
It is generally agreed as a principle of international law that, as sovereign entities, 
states are entitled to regulate their national economies independently within their 
territory.178 Undeniably, the sovereign right to regulate is one of the main components of 
the traditional conception of statehood in international law that effects the activities of 
foreign investors.179 Investors are subjected to many public policies in force in the host 
state such as the relevant taxation laws as well as regulations related to competition, 
company laws and employment and environmental protection amongst others.180  The 
majority of public policies have the potential to impact foreign investors. Such impact is 
likely to constitute a breach of international obligations where a broad definition of fair 
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and equitable treatment is adopted, or where the expropriation of an overseas investment 
is established, even if it is indirect, creeping181 or lawful. 
In the context of this section, the level of respect that arbitration tribunals have 
paid to host states’ policy space will be assessed through five selected domestic public 
policies. This will illustrate the potential conflict between the investment security 
obligations of a host country and its domestic regulatory measures. For each public 
policy, the following analysis will be considered: first of all, the scope of coverage of 
each policy in IIAs will be identified. Then the applicability of core substantive 
investment security provisions to regulatory measures will be highlighted in case law 
before being critically analysed. 
 
1  Tax law 
Taxation is, undoubtedly, one of the first elements that potential foreign investor 
will look at. It is often one of the aspects which can make the host state more competitive 
than the home country of an investor, and thus conducive to relocation. Hence 
international investment law shows a strong interest in taxation, for several reasons 
detailed below. 
Host states are sovereign with regard to the sectors of the economy in which they 
allow foreign investors to operate.182 Tax policy is a matter that clearly falls within the 
customary regulatory powers of the state. Thus, governments can specify to what extent 
financial limits (minimum or maximum) may apply on investments and what kind of 
restrictions, if any, are placed on the import or export of goods or services, allocations of 
profits, and taxes and other levies to be paid. 183  Nevertheless, host states are also 
subjected to certain obligations towards home states to respect the rights of foreign 
investors established within their territory.184   
 
(a) Scope of coverage of taxation provisions in investment agreements 
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Many different ways of treating taxation in modern bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties deserve to be closely analysed. The types of taxes covered and the 
issues surrounding such coverage are discussed below. 
International investment agreements make provision for taxation issues only to a 
limited extent on the admission, treatment and protection of foreign investment. Such 
provisions are not many in number because large networks of tax treaties – such as 
double taxation treaties – exist in parallel. UNCTAD defines such treaties as:185 
mostly of a bilateral nature and aim at the avoidance of double taxation ….  Such treaties, 
which are often based on model conventions developed by the OECD and the United 
Nations, provide for the allocation of exclusive or shared taxing rights to the contracting 
parties and for commonly agreed definitions. 
 
In 2004, the UNCTAD issued a glossary in which it provided examples of 
relevant provisions in IIAs concerning taxation measures. 186  Provisions from BITs, 
NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) will be examined.187 It appears that if 
some BITs state that the provisions on national and MFN treatment do not apply to tax 
matters, 188  others do extend those standards of treatment to legislation relating to 
taxation. An example of a formulation of the exemption of taxation issues appears in 
Article 4 of the BIT between the Netherlands and Paraguay.189 As a result, national and 
MFN treatment are granted to investors of the other party by each of the parties in respect 
of taxes, fees, charges and fiscal deductions and exemptions, except for fiscal advantages 
accorded by a party “(1) under an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation; (2) by 
virtue of its participation in a customs union, economic union or similar institution, or (3) 
on the basis of reciprocity.” 
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The coverage of taxation matters in investment agreements may also be limited by 
a general stipulation stressing that only expropriation protection will apply to taxation.190 
Thus, for example, some United States BITs have a clause stating that no provisions of 
the treaty shall impose obligations to taxation, except if a taxation measure amounts to an 
expropriation, then the expropriation and arbitration provisions will apply to claims 
resulting from it.191 This kind of exclusion reflects a strong protection of investors under 
the investment treaty at the expense of the discretion of host states in their use of tax 
measures as an instrument of regulatory power. 192  Such an approach relies on the 
definition of expropriation provided in the IIA as well as on whether a clear distinction 
between legitimate taxation measures and measures whose effect is to effectively 
expropriate the investment is expressly stipulated in the agreement.193 Also, the investor-
state arbitration procedures will apply to taxation issues arising in the context of 
investment agreements or investment authorisations.194  
By contrast, other BITs contain a general exception on taxation. The BIT between 
Argentina and New Zealand is illustrative of one type of general exception that excludes 
all taxation matters from the scope of application of the agreement. Article 5 reads:195 
 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory of 
either Contracting Party. Such matters shall be governed by the domestic laws of each 
Contracting Party and the terms of any agreement relating to taxation concluded between 
the Contracting Parties. 
 
Thus, regardless of the degree of inconsistency with any of the treaty obligations, 
no taxation laws or regulations could be successfully challenged under the BIT. Several 
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reasons for a general exception on taxation are to be identified. Dealing with exclusively 
international taxation issues in separate treaties is considered by many countries as the 
best way to retain maximum fiscal sovereignty.196  It is noticed that the density and 
complexity of tax issues might constitute matters incompatible with provisions of 
standards of treatment generally found in BITs.197 
Another interesting example is the reference to taxation measures in the 2004 
Canadian model BIT.198 This clause attempts to strike a balance between the protections 
that the BIT and an investment contract may provide to an investor, on the one hand, and 
the concern of the government authorities to safeguard flexibility to implement their 
fiscal policies, on the other. Thus, the BIT does not, in principle, apply to taxation 
measures, unless the competent authorities of each contacting party disagree among 
themselves that they in fact amount to an expropriation or that such measures violate a 
contract previously agreed between the investor and the host country. 
Article 2103 of NAFTA reserves special treatment to taxation and follows a rather 
complex structure in relation to tax matters. NAFTA contains a general exclusion of 
taxation issues,199 but then outlines a general rule of non-application to specific subjects. 
Firstly, national and MFN treatment apply to taxation measures other than certain 
categories, including taxes on income, capital gains or on the taxable capital of 
corporations and taxes on estates, subject to exceptions for advantages granted pursuant 
to double taxation treaties and to country-specific reservations. 200  Secondly, the 
provisions of NAFTA that prohibit the imposition of performance requirements as a 
condition for the receipt of an advantage also apply to taxation measures.201 Thirdly, an 
investor may refer the issue of whether or not a measure is an expropriation to 
international arbitration only if the competent tax authorities have failed to agree on it 
within a period of six months after the date on which the matter is referred to them.202  
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Finally, the ECT203 follows a similar approach to that taken under NAFTA. The 
ECT contains provisions on the application of its investment disciplines to taxation issues 
after the general exclusion of taxation matters provided in Article 21(1). By virtue of 
Article 21(3), the national and MFN treatment provisions apply to taxation measures 
other than those on income or on capital, but they shall not impose MFN obligations with 
respect to (1) advantages accorded by a party pursuant to double taxation treaties, and (2) 
they do not apply to measures aimed at ensuring the effective collection of taxes. With 
regard to expropriation, Article 21(5) requires that questions whether a taxation measure 
has expropriatory effects, or whether a taxation measure alleged to constitute an 
expropriation is discriminatory, be submitted in the first instance to the competent tax 
authorities of the contracting parties concerned. 
The fiscal concerns or taxation of the host country, regardless of the tax rate 
applied to the concerned investor, might be excessively complex, opaque, or even contain 
contradictory rules. Its pure and simple application by the host state can be considered 
incompatible with international investment law in the field of fair and equitable 
treatment. However, that does not exempt the investor from the obligation to get 
information, if necessary by using lawyers, about the tax law applicable in the host state. 
Complexity in itself is, as a result, not constitutive of a violation of the rights of the 
foreign investors. Besides, taxation does not amount to a taking. Nevertheless, when a 
state enforces a tax qualified as unreasonable or discriminatory, an expropriation will be 
found.204 A need to define expropriation with respect to tax measures becomes necessary. 
Such a need also applies to other fundamental substantive provisions of IIAs. 
This section has examined a wide range of models of tax provisions in IIAs. 
Various tax provisions aim to reflect either an exclusion of such issues from a treaty or 
the inclusion of very specific tax issues. The question remains to what extent and under 
what conditions the imposition of certain taxes could constitute a violation of the 
standards of protection contained in IIAs. 
 
(b) Tax-related arbitral awards 
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The general scope of coverage of tax under investment treaties having been 
outlined, it is now time to examine how arbitral jurisprudence has treated tax-related 
investment disputes. The growing number of recent tax-related arbitral awards and the 
increasing reliance by foreign investors on investment treaties for protection clearly 
points to the rising importance of tax disputes between foreign investors and host 
states.205 In the context of the present study, only a few cases will be examined. First, 
cases where the investor alleges that he has been subjected to discrimination or denied 
fair and equitable treatment by the host state will be considered. Then the study will 
assess cases where the investor has claimed that the host states measures have effectively 
caused an expropriation of his/her investment. 
The application of the FET standard is generally excluded for tax matters under an 
investment treaty.206 For example, NAFTA Article 2103(1) states in part:  “Except as set 
out in this Article nothing in this agreement shall apply to taxation measures.” Likewise, 
the ECT in Article 21(1) reads: “Except as otherwise provided in this Article, nothing in 
this Treaty shall create rights or impose obligations with respect to taxation measures of 
the contracting parties.” Nonetheless, some investment treaties expressly provide for the 
application of the FET to tax matters, while others exclude it together with other 
substantive investment protection provisions.  
The case Occidental Exploration & Production Co v Republic of Ecuador207 is 
illustrative of a non-NAFTA investment-treaty arbitration award raising tax issues 
conflict. Indeed, the case arose out of a dispute between a United States-based Occidental 
Petroleum investor (OEPC) and the government of Ecuador over refunds of Value-
Added-Tax (VAT) paid by Occidental to Ecuadorian tax authorities. In 1999, OEPC and 
                                                 
205
 The main tax-related cases founded on BITs are : Marvin Feldman v Mexico, above n 155; Occidental 
Exploration & Production Co v Republic of Ecuador, above n 139; Goetz and Others v Republic of 
Burundi ICSID case No. ARB/95/3 (1999) 5 ICSID Report 1; Link-Trading Joint Stock Co v Moldova, 
Final Award (18 February 2002); EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case o UN3481 
(February 2006); Corn Products International Inc v Mexican States (2008) (Decision on Responsibility) 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01 and Archer Daniels Midland Co. & Tate Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc v 
United Mexican States (2004) respectively; Grand Rivers Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd et al, v USA ; Enron 
Corporation & Ponderosa Assets LP v The Argentine Republic (2007) (Award) ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 
(ICSID) all available at http://www.investmentclaims.com or at http://www.ita.law.uvic.ca (last accessed 
10 June 2009). 
206
 Abba Kolo, Thomas W Wälde “Coverage of Taxation Under Modern Investment Treaties”, above n 
171, 328. 
207
 Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v Republic of Ecuador, above n 139. 
 47
Petroecuador (a state-owned corporation) entered into a modified participation contract 
for undertaking exploration and production of oil. During the course of its activities, 
OEPC had to pay VAT on goods and services but was entitled to claim a refund of these 
taxes. However, in 2001, the local tax authorities denied the refund requests and also 
demanded that the firm return the amounts of VAT which had been already reimbursed to 
them by the government. The regulatory measure taken by the government was founded 
on a VAT reform from the Ecuadorian tax authorities. In its award, the tribunal found 
that Ecuador had breached the United States-Ecuador BIT208 in several ways including in 
particular a breach of the national treatment obligation as well as the FET. First, the 
tribunal found that OEPC received a less favorable treatment in comparison to other local 
economic actors who were still entitled to VAT refunds under Ecuadorian tax law.209 
Second, the tribunal held that Ecuador failed in providing Occidental with a FET210 in 
light of Article X(1) of the US-Ecuador BIT which reads: “With respect to its tax 
policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness and equity in the treatment of 
investment of nationals and companies of the other party”. Also, through references to 
the preamble of the BIT211 (The preamble provides that “fair and equitable treatment of 
investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and 
maximum effective utilisation of economic resources”) and other awards as guidance,212 
the tribunal determined that the United States firm faced a vague and unstable legal and 
business environment and that such a lack of clarity in tax law changes about its meaning, 
extent, practice and regulations amounted to a denial of fair and equitable treatment.213  
The arbitral tribunal considered that the standard of treatment required by Article 
X(1) of the United States-Ecuador BIT is not devoid of legal significance: 214  
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It imposes an obligation on the host state that is not different from the substantive 
obligation of fair and equitable treatment… even though this article involves a 
commitment that cannot be ignored by the parties in the implementation of their tax 
policies. 
 
This explanation was supported by the Explanatory Note to the Treaty from the United 
States government which stated that the article X(1) of the BIT on tax policies “exhorts 
both countries to provide fair and equitable treatment to investors with respect to tax 
policies.”215 
The host state may be sanctioned for discriminatory taxation. The two main 
principles of national treatment and most-favoured nation necessitate each party to 
provide treatment that is no less encouraging than that presented to its domestic investors, 
or that of any third party state, which face the same situations.216   Nevertheless, in 
addition to the standards of treatment, with regards to tax matters, there are exceptions 
which do not require contracting parties to extend to other contracting parties the 
advantages or privileges concerning whole or partial taxation given to investors of a third 
state.217 The fundamental objective of such provisions is to strike a balance between the 
core of the obligations of non-discrimination and economic sovereignty of states to 
confer new treaties and ratify new legislation which would suit the needs of the third 
party better without jeopardising the NT and MFN obligations.218  This facilitates states 
bound by an investment treaty to make the best of the changing fiscal and political 
climate, by way of negotiating tax benefits for the third state without contravening their 
treaty requirements. 219  There are often exceptions involved in the current treatment 
practices involved in BITs, primarily to circumvent the export of individual tax 
arrangements per double taxation treaty, by regional fiscal amalgamation, legislation, and 
finally by special project contracts.220 Perhaps the most important application of both 
standards is in scenarios where a government either deliberately or inadvertently 
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discriminates between domestic investors on the one hand and foreign investors in 
competition with domestic investors, on the other.221    
Even in the event of very favorable taxation initially – where the rate applied to 
the investor is low or exemptions or refunds are available – the host country will be 
required to compensate an investor deprived of effective use of his goods and assets. By 
contrast, the taxation of the host state can also be detrimental to the existence of the 
investment. Therefore, international law will be able to punish this system in accordance 
with the prohibition of excessive taxation that appears in some recent bilateral 
conventions of protection and promotion of investments. An indirect expropriation may 
arise if the property of a foreign investor is subjected to excessive and repetitive taxation 
without sufficient justification for such a heavy taxation.222 If a contracting party adopted 
taxation measures inconsistent with any of the obligations of the agreement other than 
those on national treatment and MFN treatment, they could in principle, be challenged 
under the dispute settlement procedures contained in the BIT (for example: an excessive 
taxation amounting to indirect expropriation after “confiscatory tax measures”). 
Situations in which a taking may not occur can be found among the taxation of windfall 
profits 223  (unexpected profits arising from causes not controlled by the investor). 224 
Moreover, Sornarajah points out that “taxation of the oil industry for windfall profits due 
to price hikes cannot amount to a taking.” In contrast, international authorities remark 
that taxation can amount to an expropriation.225  
In this light, the case Link-Trading v Moldova226 dealt with a claim that changes 
in customs and tax regulations were expropriatory. In its claim under the 1993 United 
States-Republic of Moldova BIT, the claimant alleged it suffered an indirect 
expropriation because of a change in the rates of duties and VAT exemptions, which 
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caused the failure of the claimant’s business consisting essentially of the import of 
consumer products into the Free Economic Zone of Chisinau and their resale to 
Moldovan customers.227  The tribunal held that fiscal measures become expropriatory 
when they amount to an “abusive taking”.228 The terms of unfairness, arbitrariness and 
discrimination or the violation of a state undertaking were used to define abusive.229 The 
tribunal held that the changes in the customs and tax regime were neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory.230 The new tax measures adopted by the Moldovan government were 
rather of general application and therefore not directed specifically against the 
claimant.231 Besides, the tribunal found that the changes did not “place the claimant in a 
worse competitive position than any other similarly situated businesses in Moldova”.232 
In this particular case, the claimant had not presented enough proof of a causal link 
between the tax measures in question and the decline of its business.233  
 
2  Bankruptcy law 
 
Where a state places a company into liquidation, this can obviously affect the 
foreign investor, since it results in a loss of control over the asset. 
The introduction of unilateral insolvency by the administration or the incitement 
of this by preliminary requisitioning can thus constitute an expropriation which requires 
compensation for the investor. Without this intervention, a company would not have to be 
concerned about a suspension of payment nor would the investor be deprived of the right 
to exercise his property rights. In the ELSI case, the court did not find any expropriation 
because the financial position of the company was sufficiently damaged to justify 
liquidation. 234  The causal link between the acts of the state (set in liquidation by 
summons) and the disappearance of the use of property rights was thus lacking. 
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The ELSI case raised the question whether a requisitioning of the plant and assets 
of an Italian company (ELSI) based in Sicily but owned by United States corporations 
caused the bankruptcy of ELSI and thus violated substantive rights protected by the FCN 
Treaty235 in force between the two parties to the dispute.236 The Court held that ELSI was 
already formally bankrupt under Italian law before the requisition order had taken 
place. 237  Thus the requisitioning of the plant was not the principal cause for the 
bankruptcy of ELSI as well as the failure of its orderly liquidation plan, and did not 
constitute a violation of the United States shareholders’ rights to “control and manage” 
ELSI under the FCN Treaty. It is clear that no right of control and management would 
have remained protected under the Treaty if ELSI were insolvent before the requisition 
was ordered. Therefore, the claim of the United States was dismissed as the Court 
reached the conclusion that “what really deprived Raytheon and Machlett, as 
shareholders, of their right to dispose of real property of ELSI, was not the requisition but 
the precarious financial state of ELSI, ultimately leading inescapably to bankruptcy.”238 
 
In contrast, it is notable for example that the ASEAN Agreement239 contains a 
provision that refers to the protection against the abuse of the process of liquidation. Thus 
Article IV(1) of the Agreement states: 
 
Each contracting party shall, within its territory, ensure full protection of the investments 
made in accordance with its legislation by investors of the other Contracting Parties and 
shall not impair by unjustified or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment, extension, or disposition or liquidation of such investments. 
 
In Yaung Chi Oo Ltd v Myanmar240 the claimant had argued that an act of taking took 
place as a result of the liquidation proceedings before the Myanmar courts. The tribunal 
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disagreed with the argument. Indeed, a taking may not take place solely because of a 
liquidation ordered by a court.  
 A recent verdict of an UNCITRAL tribunal in a dispute between Saluka 
Investments BV (The Netherlands) and the Czech Republic exemplifies the clash 
between the provisions of an investment treaty and the routine exercise of regulatory 
powers of the host state. 241  The case arose from the proceedings that were the 
consequences of reorganisation and privatisation of the Czech banking sector which was 
done by selling IPB, one of the key players in the Czech banking sector, to a corporation 
within the Nomura group. Following this, Nomura sold the bought shares to one of the 
auxiliary parties, Saluka Investments BV. IPB around this time was on the brink of 
bankruptcy, due to negligence and its liberal lending policy, and was hence put into 
obligatory administration by the Czech government. The Czech government decided to 
sell IPB to another Czech company, ESOB. This decision sparked controversy among 
Nomura shareholders as they were stakeholders for over 46% of IPB shares. Following 
this, Nomura initiated an arbitration claiming loss of investments and asserted that the 
government measures were a bid to expropriate, while the Czech Republic deemed their 
measures to be “permissible regulatory actions”.242 The tribunal was presented with the 
challenge of deciding on whether the government measures in this case were lawfully 
admissible under Article 5 of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic.243Article 5 of the BIT states: 
 
Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, 
investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments unless the following 
conditions are complied with: 
(a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; 
(b) the measures are not discriminatory; 
(c) the measures are accompanied by provision for the payment of just compensation. 
Such compensation shall represent the genuine value of the investments affected and 
shall, in order to be effective for the claimants, be paid and made transferable, without 
undue delay, to the country designated by the claimants concerned and in any freely 
convertible currency accepted by the claimants. 
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The tribunal held that in imposing the forced administration of IPB on 16 June 
2000 the Czech Republic adopted a measure that was valid and permissible and within its 
regulatory powers, notwithstanding that the measure had the effect of eviscerating the 
investment of Saluka in IPB.244 Explaining the permissibility of regulatory actions by 
governments in general international law, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that:245 
 
Article 5 imports into the Treaty the customary international law notion that a 
deprivation can be justified if it results from the exercise of regulatory actions aimed at 
the maintenance of public order. 
 
 
The Tribunal went on to add:246 
 
It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation 
to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they 
adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the 
general welfare. 
 
In taking into account all of the above considerations; the important issues to note 
are that an order of liquidation incited by the government cannot constitute an 
expropriation which implies compensation for the investor when foreign companies are 
already in a failing situation. It is important to list out in treaties and agreements the 
permissible regulatory actions regarding procedures of liquidation so that there are no 
disputes or conflicts arising out of such issues.   
 
3  Environmental law 
 
Environmental protection is a particularly ambiguous issue because the foreign 
investors can, in this regard, have contradictory interests. On the one hand, it could be 
said that certain investors seek host countries with lower environmental standards, in 
order to make more profits than in their country of origin. On the other hand, the 
investors would seek to establish themselves within a sufficiently healthy environmental 
framework to be able to attract social capital and, very often, in order to sell their 
products in their home country. 
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Regardless of the validity of each of these theories, environmental protection, like 
the other public policies, is of interest to international investment law. The concept of 
environmental protection is broad because it includes concepts of the preservation of the 
quality of the air, water, and soil; the sustainable use of natural resources; the 
preservation of human, animal and plant life and health, and of the ecosystem more 
generally.247 The basis of environmental regulation policy is therefore based on these key 
issues. 1972 is often given as the birth date of modern international environmental law, 
when countries gathered for the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment.248 Since then, hundreds of international environmental agreements have 
been concluded at bilateral, regional and global levels. States have therefore an obligation 
to take regulatory measures with the purpose of protecting the environment under both 
customary and conventional international law. These cover areas such as biodiversity, 
climate change and protection of the ozone layer among others.249 The protection of 
environment has gradually emerged as a new issue in several BITs. Indeed, some 
agreements have reiterated the authority of national governments to design and 
implement measures to safeguard certain values such as the environment.  
The investor could encounter unforeseeable difficulties in environmental law 
given the interpretation of a growing number of courts of arbitration, if the interpretations 
are standards of general application.  
Environmental protection applies not only to states but also to private non-state 
actors such as corporations. It concerns many acts and can affect investors in several 
ways. The measures designed to protect the environment are applicable from the 
establishment of the investment, but may be unknown to the investor because of promises 
of exemption or exemptions previously allocated but subsequently withdrawn, for 
example. Alternatively, the foreign investor may be unaware of such measures due to 
lack of clarity, false or contradictory information provided by the legal administration. In 
another situation, the measures of protection of the environment may be introduced a 
posteriori and differ from the initial expectations of the investor.  
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Therefore, the relationship and the issues that may arise between investment 
protection and provisions of environmental protection in IIAs will be illustrated taking 
into account some provisions of investment agreements and the case law with a particular 
focus on the issues of expropriation, stabilisation and compensation. Host states grant 
themselves the right to interfere when, for example, multinational corporations cause 
environmental pollution. The regulatory right of the state might prevent a foreign investor 
from harmful decisions protecting the environment.250  
 
(a) Scope of coverage of environmental provisions in investment agreements 
 
The protections that can be the basis for a dispute over environmental regulation 
under BITs, NAFTA or plurilateral agreements like the ECT are generally standards of 
treatment such as national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment as well as 
prohibitions of expropriation.  
A certain number of standards of protection regarding the environment included 
in IIAs need to be examined. Four categories can be distinguished: 251  (1) the 
responsibility of governments or enterprises with regard to environmental protection; (2) 
the regulatory power of states to take measures for the protection of health and 
environment; (3) the avoidance of relaxation of environmental standards as a means of 
attracting FDI; and (4) the promotion, development and transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies and management practices. Thus, such issues which can be found as 
provisions in free trade agreements or investment treaties might be breached and 
consequently lead to an arbitration dispute. Therefore, it is of interest to mention several 
provisions which address environmental concerns.  
First of all, some agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty contain provisions 
regarding the liability of governments or corporations for violations of environmental 
norms. The ECT specifically states that each party is required to “strive to minimize in an 
economically efficient manner harmful Environmental Impacts occurring either within or 
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outside its Area from all operations within the Energy Cycle in its Area, taking proper 
account of safety.”252 
Also, a few investment treaties affirm the sovereign right of the parties to an 
agreement to take appropriate environmental protection measures. An example of such a 
provision can be found in NAFTA in its Article 1114 (1): 
 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate 
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns. 
 
In addition, Article 1106 (6) of NAFTA stipulates, with respect to provisions on 
performance requirements, a specific exception for environmental measures:  
 
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do 
not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment, nothing in 
paragraph 1(b) or (c) or 3(a) or (b) shall be construed to prevent any Party from adopting 
or maintaining measures, including environmental measures: 
[…] 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or  
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 
 
In a similar manner to the Article 1114 (1) of NAFTA, another type of provision 
may stress an exception for environmental measures that applies to all provisions of an 
investment agreement. Annex I(III)(1) of the BIT between Canada and Uruguay253 reads:  
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement 
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken 
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
 
Some agreements discourage the lowering of domestic standards as a means of 
attracting FDI. Accordingly, the new Canadian model BIT (CAFTA)254 and the Canada-
Chile Free Trade Agreement provides in this regard that:255  
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The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic 
health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as 
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory 
of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an 
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall 
consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.  
 
The above provision, not defining the term “environmental measures,” seems to 
cover any law, regulation or administrative decision regulating environmental matters in 
the territory of the contracting parties. The clause addresses the waiving or relaxing of 
“any” environmental measure or offering to do so in order to attract or maintain an 
investment. Thus, it would be unnecessary to demonstrate a continuous tendency of 
behavior by a contracting party in violation of the commitment. 
The 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Non-Binding Investment 
Principles have stated environmental measures under its investment incentives provision. 
They read as follows: “Member economies will not relax health, safety, and 
environmental regulations as an incentive to encourage foreign investment.”256  
Finally, one must be aware of the transfer of environmentally sound technologies 
and the diffusion and utilisation of sound environmental management practices.257 A few 
IIAs and other international instruments address this issue. This facet as well as the 
general protection of environment is generally referred to with respect to the 
responsibility of both host countries and foreign companies.  For example, Article 19 
concerning environmental aspects of the Energy Charter Treaty contains an extensive list 
of matters that the contracting parties should do in pursuit of sustainable development. 
Inter alia, they should “encourage favourable conditions for the transfer and 
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dissemination of such technologies consistent with the adequate and effective protection 
of Intellectual Property rights.”258 
The preceding review of provisions that address the linkage between the 
environment and FDI reflects, as is the case with the protection of the environment in 
general, the recognition of the need to address this issue in international agreements. 
Indeed, as the analysis demonstrates, there is room to strengthen relevant provisions in 
the sense of awareness to encourage multinational enterprises to develop their activities 
in an environmentally friendly manner. 
The relationship between the investment agreement and other international 
treaties dealing with environmental matters is not often mentioned. However, various 
United States agreements refer to multilateral environmental treaties to which the Parties 
are both party. For example, Article 19.8 of the United States-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) states:259 
 
The Parties recognise that multilateral environmental agreements to which they are both 
party play an important role, globally and domestically, in protecting the environment and 
that their respective implementation of these agreements is critical to achieving the 
environmental objectives of these agreements. Accordingly, the Parties shall continue to 
seek means to enhance the mutual supportiveness of multilateral environmental agreements 
to which they are both party. The Parties shall consult regularly with respect to negotiations 
in the WTO regarding multilateral environmental agreements. 
 
 
In consequence, a number of international investment agreements recognise the 
right of states to adopt certain measures designed to ensure that investment activity is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. The previous listing of 
provisions from different treaties is illustrative of this reality. 
Finally and interestingly, a draft article of an agreement between the EU and the 
Pacific members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries 
of June 2006 takes a step forward in narrowing the scope of regulatory measures as non-
compensable expropriations:260 
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Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary international law 
principles on police powers, bona fide, non-discriminatory regulatory measures taken 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute an 
expropriation under this Article. 
 
 If this draft article remains in the adoption of the final agreement, it would 
constitute an important new trend in foreign investment law and would possibly be more 
protective in acknowledging the exercise of the regulatory powers of host states.  
 
(b)  Environment-related arbitral awards 
 
Environmental issues have arisen in a number of arbitrations under NAFTA and 
under BITs. It is interesting to now take a closer look at four disputes that have arisen 
under NAFTA provisions on investment. The cases introduced below were chosen 
because they are recent decisions and contain significant analysis of the issues and 
provide useful examples of how disputes have been resolved by tribunals. In these 
controversial investor-state disputes, developed states alleged a breach of environmental 
standards (environmental abuse) against foreign multinational corporations of other 
developed states parties to the treaty. 
The main issue was to determine whether a regulatory interference to promote 
environmental interests resulted in a taking of property of the foreign investor. However, 
in the majority of these cases expropriation was not determined by the tribunals to have 
occurred.  
When expropriation occurs, it usually results in the deprivation of the property of 
a foreign investor. Nonetheless, under the majority of international investment 
agreements an expropriation is considered to be lawful if three conditions are respected: 
the taking of the investment must be for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner 
and with compensation. In addition, another form of taking, namely indirect 
expropriation has become increasingly important. Indirect expropriations involve the 
effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value of 
the assets of a foreign investor.261 
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The Methanex case262 arose out of a dispute between a Canadian corporation, 
Methanex, and the state of California. Methanex claimed that two California 
environmental measures which banned a gasoline additive (MTBE) amounted to a 
violation of the United States obligations under NAFTA, especially that the California 
law violated national treatment, was inconsistent with the fair and equitable treatment 
article and constituted indirect expropriation. The Methanex case has adopted what Mann 
describes a “modern regulatory approach to the police powers concept”263 in deciding 
that:264  
 
As a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensatory unless specific commitments had been given by the 
regulating government to then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation. 
 
The tribunal found that there was no indirect expropriation. The tribunal’s final 
award dismissed all of Methanex’s claims and rejected some of the findings in the 
Metalclad case in which regulatory measures were regarded to be expropriation and thus 
compensable. The exception for “specific commitments” given by the government echoes 
the reasoning in the Metalclad case.265 In finding that no promises were made regarding 
future regulation of MTBE, the tribunal noted that:266 
 
Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not notorious, 
that governmental environmental and health protection institutions at the federal and 
state level, … continuously monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and 
commonly prohibited or restricted use of some of those compounds for environmental 
and/or health reasons. 
 
In addition, the tribunal held that “from the standpoint of international law, the 
California ban was a lawful regulation and not an expropriation.” 267  It was also 
considered significant that the host state had made no commitments to Methanex not to 
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amend its regulatory framework. Thus it seems that unless the host state gives the 
investor a stabilisation commitment prior to its investment, the investor will bear the risk 
of legally enacted changes in the regulation of a host state.  
NGOs have played an increased and influential role in defending environment 
concerns via amicus curiae submissions. It is relevant to point out a few arguments raised 
by an environmental NGO, namely the IISD.268 Hence, investor-state arbitrations do not 
shield investors from regulatory measures producing a negative impact on their 
activities.269  Furthermore, investors are presumed to be aware of the environment in 
which they are investing.270 The state can take regulatory measures via the protection of 
the environment and the promotion of sustainable development which do not constitute 
the forms of regulation that a host state is allowed in relation to foreign investors and 
investments. 271  The Preamble and objectives of NAFTA and the few international 
investment law arbitrations that have decided on this issue emphasise this notion. 272  
Investors who have been denied permits on alleged environmental grounds have 
prevailed in a number of arbitrations including the Metalclad case. Metalclad purchased a 
Mexican company (COTERIN) in order to develop and operate a hazardous waste 
landfill that it constructed in the municipality of Guadalcázar. Although COTERIN was 
the owner of permits to construct and operate the landfill delivered by the federal 
government of Mexico and the state government of San Luis Potosi, the municipality of 
Guadalcázar interfered by denying a municipal construction permit to COTERIN and in 
declaring the landfill to be an ecological reserve. Hence, Metalclad introduced an action 
under the NAFTA and claimed that an ecological decree promulgated after the claim was 
made, violated Article 1110 requiring compensation for expropriation. The tribunal found 
a violation of NAFTA Article 1110273 and stated that in order to decide on an indirect 
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expropriation, it “need not decide or consider the motivation, nor intent of the adoption of 
the Ecological Decree”.274 The Tribunal held:275 
 
Expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings 
of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the 
host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be 
expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
host State. 
 
The broad definition of expropriation applied by the arbitral tribunal has not been 
used or adopted in other awards.276 In this particular case, an indirect expropriation was 
found as a result of the denial of a construction permit which amounted to indirect 
expropriation.277 Evidently, the mere denial of a construction permit did not constitute the 
only reason that led the tribunal to the finding of an expropriation.278 To a certain extent 
the disappointment of legitimate investor expectations created by the environmental 
measure of the host state was decisive for this result. 279  In this case, the Federal 
government guaranteed that the project of the investor for a landfill had conformed to all 
relevant environmental regulations.280 It was against this background that the subsequent 
local and regional measures of denying the construction permit and declaring the land in 
question an ecological zone were considered to be indirect expropriation:281 
 
By permitting or tolerating the conduct of Guadalcazar in relation to Metalclad which 
the Tribunal has already held amounts to unfair and inequitable treatment breaching 
Article 1105 and by thus participating or acquiescing in the denial to Metalclad of the 
right to operate the landfill, notwithstanding the fact that the project was fully approved 
and endorsed by the federal government, Mexico must be held to have taken a measure 
tantamount to expropriation in violation of NAFTA Article 1110(1). 
 
If a contract or a treaty has been found to be breached by a tribunal, then 
compensation is the most likely remedy that will be awarded to the claimant. Recently, 
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there has been discussion over whether the interference of a government with an 
investment should also be taken into account in the determination of the value of the 
compensation to be awarded. In Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A v Costa 
Rica,282 a dispute arising out from a United States-Costa Rica BIT and resolved under 
ICSID rules, there was no disagreement over the fact that a direct expropriation took 
place (in 1978, Costa Rica issued an expropriation decree for Santa Elena aiming at 
declaring it a preservation site even though the claimant intended to develop a tourist 
resort) or that it was for valid purpose (the protection of biodiversity). However, the 
amount of compensation owed by Costa Rica to the claimant constituted the main 
disagreement between the parties. Costa Rica argued that setting the amount of 
compensation too high would discourage states (particularly those from the developing 
world) from adopting environmental objectives, and also noted that when it made the 
expropriation it had acted in accordance with its obligations under multilateral 
environmental agreements. The panel expressly indicated that the environmental purpose 
had no influence and concluded that the standard of compensation could not be affected 
by the reasons for making the expropriation. The panel held that:283  
 
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking 
for a public purpose, and thus be legitimate, the fact that the property was taken for this 
reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for 
the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was 
taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation 
must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes 
no difference. 
 
It also added:284 
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and beneficial to society 
as a whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state 
may take in order to implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for 
environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay 
compensation remains. 
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 It is noticed that the arbitral tribunal was reluctant to have regard to international 
environmental obligations in determining the level of compensation to be paid for a 
lawful expropriation. 
In SD Myers,285 a United States company which was involved in the remediation 
of toxic waste challenged the decision of Canada to ban the trans-boundary shipment of 
toxic waste to the United States for processing. The company claimed that Canada 
violated NAFTA Chapter 11.286 The tribunal found Canada in breach of the national 
treatment standard and the minimum international standard of treatment.287 This decision 
also held that Canada did not breach Chapter 11 with respect to expropriation (Article 
1110).288 An interim order which is no longer in effect in Canada was the measure on 
which the tribunal based its decision. The tribunal recognised the right of NAFTA 
members to “establish high levels of environmental protection. They are not obliged to 
compromise their standards merely to satisfy the political or economic interests of other 
states.”289 Accordingly, the award confirms that NAFTA members retain the ability to 
regulate the safe movement and disposal of hazardous wastes, including PCB wastes 
which was subjected to the ban.  
When environmental measures may justify non-compensation under expropriation 
case law, one can notice that the deficiency in jurisprudence is not sufficiently apparent 
to draw guidance. This area is therefore subject to many controversies.290 
Stabilisation clauses may be used by investors to seek to exclude subsequently 
introduced environmental regulations.291 Such clauses are any provision of a contract 
signed between a state and a foreign corporation in which the state promises that no 
future changes in law will be applied to the investment. 292  Stabilisation clauses are 
therefore aimed at freezing the law relevant to the investment.  
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Wälde and N’Di consider that: “stability of key investment conditions responsible 
for the economic and financial performance of the investment venture is at the heart of 
investor concern”.293 The above authors also note that an investor may be desirous to 
include a stabilisation clause to the contract when other issues are at stake:294 
 
Perhaps most relevant at the moment is the imposition of new environmental obligations 
by subsequent regulation or by an administrative/judicial ruling re-interpreting existing law 
on which, arguably, the investment decision may to some extent have been based. 
  
Some authors point out that a stabilisation clause could even cover environmental 
regulations without explicitly referring to it. For example, a stabilisation of the fiscal 
regime could cover market-based environmental measures.295 
 Sornarajah contends that despite a contractual agreement denying the application 
of new standards to the investment, it cannot “fetter the legislative sovereignty of the 
states from extending its control over the investment”.296 Calling the binding nature of 
stabilisation clauses into question, he suggests that a state cannot waive or limit its own 
sovereignty in such a manner. Thus stabilisation clauses:297 
 
may not serve as anything more than a comforter to the foreign investor, who may derive 
some security from the belief that there is a promise secured from the state not to apply its 
future legislation to the agreement. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the academic debate, tribunals have consistently upheld 
stabilisation clauses.298 In conclusion, even if a stabilisation clause may not prevent a 
state from changing legislation, the breach of such a clause is likely to lead to a 
requirement to compensate the investor for losses incurred. Stabilisation clauses might 
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take two different main forms. According to the so-called freezing clauses, the obligation 
to compensate will arise when a regulatory change is applied to the investment project, 
whilst under economic equilibrium clauses this obligation is elicited by regulatory 
measures that affect the fiscal stability. Under the stabilisation clause, the limit beyond 
which the host government must compensate is significantly lower than that which is 
pertinent to regulatory takings under general international law (changes to the “economic 
equilibrium” of the project rather than “substantial deprivation” of property rights).299 
The protection offered to investors may limit the ability of governments to 
regulate investment for the protection of the environment, natural resources and other 
social goods, and to ensure that foreign investment contributes to overall national 
development goals. Indeed, regulators may face uncertainty given the lack of 
transparency in arbitration and the lack of consistency of tribunal decisions. 
 
4  Labour law 
 
The labour law of the host state is also of great practical interest. Foreign 
investors often have activities with a strong labour component in the host state, generally 
because the production costs tend to be lower than in their home state. One example is 
the establishment of a European automotive industry in countries where social costs are 
less, such as: Volkswagen in Czech Republic, Renault in Romania and  Mercedes-Benz 
in South Africa. 
 Accordingly, the legal system applicable to the employees would be of interest to 
the investors. It is thus possible that international investment law is invoked against 
measures taken by the host state regarding the labour laws. This is true especially for the 
standards relating to minimum wage, working hours or social contributions. However, the 
host state is unlikely to be sanctioned for measures in this field if the increased costs are 
unforeseen to the investor, as it is a normal investment risk. More particularly, such a 
measure would be by nature non-discriminatory and thus in conformity with the principle 
of the national treatment as well with the most-favoured nation treatment. Moreover, the 
standards of work are generally known to the point that one could reproach the investor 
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for not being sufficiently informed about the ruling legislation, rather than to sanction the 
host country for a supposed opacity in this respect. 
Employment and labour provisions are relatively uncommon in IIAs. The most 
comprehensive international instruments in the area of the development of labour and 
social policy standards need to be considered.300 Indeed, discussions upon the conduct of 
activities of MNEs led to a definition of their relation with host countries, especially 
those in the developing world. Therefore, two bodies of rules emerged in the area of 
employment practices. Labour standards as well as the issue of the responsibility of 
enterprises are first contained in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the 
ILO Declaration) 301  adopted in 1977 as supplemented by the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work302 of 1998. The 1998 Declaration sets core 
labour standards not specific to foreign investment and provides to its ILO members the 
obligation to observe four fundamental rights in its Article 2:  
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and  
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
 
Second, labour standards are also included in the OECD Guideline on Employment 
and Industrial Relations (the OECD Guideline)303 adopted in 1976 and revised in 2000. 
Since the OECD Guideline is less detailed in its content on Employment and Industrial 
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Relations as part of a general guideline in all major areas of business than the ILO 
Declaration, more attention will be drawn to the latter.  
Both codes are voluntary in nature304 and thus provide recommendations and non-
legally binding norms for the governments, employers and workers organisations of both 
home and host countries and to MNEs.305 The main areas covered by the ILO Declaration 
are employment, training, conditions of work and life and industrial relations. 
 Three main issues covered under the employment issue are namely employment 
promotion, equality of opportunity and treatment and security of employment. Thus, the 
promotion of employment is asserted to be important by the ILO Declaration. 
Governments should “declare and pursue as a major goal, an active policy designed to 
promote full, productive and freely chosen employment”,306  and MNEs, “particularly 
when operating in developing countries, should endeavour to increase employment 
opportunities and standards, taking into account the employment policies and objectives 
of the governments, as well as security of employment and the long-term development of 
the enterprise”.307  
Also, the Declaration provides that “all governments should pursue policies 
designed to promote equality of opportunity and treatment in employment, with a view to 
eliminating any discrimination based on race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin.”308 Equally, pursuing discriminatory policies309 by 
MNEs should never be encouraged by governments. For example, one current form of 
discrimination is the failure to provide equal pay for men and women despite the fact that 
the European Union defends the view that men and women are of equal worth.310 It is 
recommended that governments study the impact of MNEs on employment and develop 
suitable policies to deal with the employment and labour market impacts on MNE 
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operations.311 MNEs are encouraged to assume a leading role in promoting security of 
employment, particularly in countries where the discontinuation of operations is likely to 
accentuate long-term unemployment.312 Besides, MNEs and national enterprises should, 
through active manpower planning, “endeavour to provide stable employment for their 
employees and should observe freely negotiated obligations concerning employment 
stability and social security.”313  
With regard to the training of workers from MNEs, the ILO Declaration 
encourages governments to develop national policies for vocational training and 
guidance, closely linked with employment.314 Thus, relevant training should be provided 
for all levels of employees in the host country to meet the need of the enterprise as well 
as the development policies of the country. It should develop generally useful skills and 
promote career opportunities.315 
Under the conditions of work and life heading, the ILO Declaration applies the 
national treatment standard to wages, benefits and conditions of work: “Wages, benefits 
and conditions of work offered by multinational enterprises should be not less favourable 
to the workers than those offered by comparable employers in the country concerned.”316 
Additionally, the Declaration states that “multinational enterprises, as well as national 
enterprises, should respect the minimum age for admission to employment or work in 
order to secure the effective abolition of child labour.”317 
Finally, the Declaration deals with five issues in relation to industrial relations: 
freedom of association and the right to organise, collective bargaining, consultation, 
examination of grievances, and the settlement of industrial disputes. The principle of 
national treatment is guaranteed to each area: “multinational enterprises should observe 
standards of industrial relations not less favourable than those observed by comparable 
employers in the country concerned.”318 
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The ILO has extensive mechanisms for supervising the application of its standards 
and Conventions. First, regular supervision is based on the obligation of governments 
which are members of the Conventions they have ratified to provide regular, periodic 
reports on measures taken.319 Secondly, special systems provide for ad hoc procedures 
and allow examination of complaints by employers or workers organisations and other 
governments concerning alleged failure by a country to apply a Convention it has 
ratified.320  
The emergence of the protection of labour standards in IIAs is quite recent and it 
is noticeable that the number of agreements addressing this issue is lower than the 
number of agreements dealing with environmental protection. Such a narrow reference to 
social matters will be identified in the following paragraph in bilateral investment treaties 
and investment provisions in trade agreements. 
Frequently, labour concerns are incorporated in the BIT preambles through a political 
statement. For example, the BIT between Finland and Nicaragua states:321 
The Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Republic of 
Nicaragua, hereinafter referred to as the “Contracting Parties”, ... agreeing that a stable 
framework for investment will contribute to maximising the effective utilisation of 
economic resources and improve living standards; recognising that the development of 
economic and business ties can promote respect for internationally recognised labour 
rights; …  
 
Several other BITs stress that the contracting parties must explicitly strive to 
abstain from relaxing labour standards as a means of attracting or maintaining investment 
in their territories. Article 6 of the BIT between Belgium and Ethiopia is illustrative of 
this kind of provision.322 This provision is complemented by a definition of the term 
“labour legislation”:323  
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The terms “labour legislation” shall mean legislation of the Kingdom of Belgium, of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg or of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, or 
provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following internationally recognised 
labour rights: 
a) the right of association; 
b) the right to organise and bargain collectively; 
c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour; 
d) a minimum age for the employment of children; 
e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health. 
 
It is recognised that each country has the right “to establish its own domestic 
labour standards and accordingly adopt or modify its labour legislation”.324 However, it is 
also stated that each contracting party “shall strive to ensure” 325  that its legislation 
provides for labour standards consistent with the labour rights listed in the definition of 
“labour legislation” cited above, which are considered being internationally recognised 
labour rights. This refers to the obligations of each party derived from their membership 
of the ILO and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.  
Likewise, the United States Model BIT 2004, Article 13 reads as follows:326 
1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or reducing the 
protections afforded in domestic labour laws […] 
2. for purposes of this Article, “labour laws” means each Party’s statutes or regulations,327 or provisions 
thereof that are directly related to the following internationally recognized labour rights:  
 
(a) the right of association;  
 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively;  
 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;  
(d) labour protections for children and young people, including a minimum age for 
the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labor; and  
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(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, 
and occupational safety and health. 
 
 Provisions under BITs constitute interesting alternative tools to promote labour 
rights as well as social justice. 
A number of regional FTAs, particularly found in the Americas, include a chapter 
on investment. Social provisions are also mentioned. 
The United States-Chile FTA328 contains several preamble clauses that reference 
social issues. Indeed, the parties resolve to:329 
 
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working conditions and living 
standards in their respective territories; 
BUILD on their respective international commitments and strengthen their co-operation on 
labour matters; 
PROTECT, enhance, and enforce basic worker’s rights; 
[…] 
 
In addition, the United States-Chile FTA states that the Parties recognise that co-
operation provides enhanced opportunities for the Parties to promote respect for the 
principles embodied in the ILO Declaration and the ILO Convention No 182 Concerning 
the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour (1999)330 and that the Parties agree to cooperate on labour issues under a Labour 
Cooperation Mechanism.331 
 The NAFTA text makes a few references to labour issues. The preamble of the 
main agreement includes two general objectives regarding labour: “create new 
employment opportunities and improve working conditions and living standards” and 
“protect, enhance and enforce basic worker’s rights”. Also, it is noteworthy that on the 
issue of a “no lowering of standards” clause, certain IIAs contain a clause whereby the 
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parties agree not to compete for inward FDI by lowering employment standards. In this 
connection, Article 1114 of NAFTA is relevant in stressing that: 
It is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or 
environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not otherwise derogate from, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an 
investor. If a Party considers that another party and the two parties shall consult with a 
view to avoiding such encouragement. 
  
Though limited to health, safety and environmental measures, the approach of this 
provision can be adapted to employment issues in general, as well as to other emerging 
issues. 
Similarly the very recent New Zealand-China FTA332 signed in 2008 provides a 
reference to social matters:333  
 
Desiring to strengthen their economic partnership to bring economic and social benefits, 
to create new opportunities for employment and to improve the living standards of their 
peoples; 
 
Disputes involving labour issues do not appear to have been addressed by any 
arbitral tribunal. However, the case Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & others v South 
Africa,334 is a pending claim on affirmative action for black employees in South Africa. 
The claimants are several Italian citizens and a Luxembourg corporation that hold 
interests in South African granite quarrying companies. Four NGOs in coalition have 
filled a petition and hope to gain permission to comment on how the tribunal might 
consider the crucial domestic and international human rights issues that the case has 
raised. The claimants challenge the validity of the social transformation measures of the 
South African government under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) of 2002 enacted for public policy reasons.335 One of them is the need to 
proactively redress the apartheid history of exploitive labour practices and the inequality 
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in labour market black South Africans and other ethnic groups.336 The hearings for this 
case are currently scheduled for April 2010. 
5  State taking of property sector 
 
The taking of private assets by public authorities raises significant issues of 
international law, where such takings involve the assets of foreign investors. This section 
examines the concept of expropriation in the context of international law and IIAs.  The 
focus of the analysis is twofold. First, different categories of takings are distinguished, 
addressing in particular the problem of the distinction between governmental measures 
that involve interference with the assets of foreign investors, yet do not require 
compensation, and those that do require compensation. Second, the assessment of when a 
state regulatory measure becomes an expropriation will be made via a close study of 
arbitral awards. 
 
(a) Scope of coverage of taking provisions in investment agreements 
 
BITs and other international instruments for the protection of foreign investment 
virtually always contain provisions prohibiting the taking of assets of foreign investors by 
public authorities. Nevertheless, such takings are considered to be lawful if they respect 
four requirements namely, if done for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, 
with payment of compensation, and, in many cases, with due process of law.  
There has often been a debate between the definition of the terms “expropriation” 
– taking the property of an individual firm and “nationalisation” – taking property in an 
industry or economy-wide context.337 The argument further advanced that expropriation 
is subjected to a different standard of compensation than nationalisation. IIAs 
traditionally do not make such a difference and a single set of rules pertain to both 
expropriation and nationalisation. Typical in this respect is Article 13(1) of the 1994 
Energy Charter Treaty, which states: 
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Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting 
Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Expropriation’) except where such Expropriation is… 
 
It is traditionally acknowledged that the notion of expropriation is not restricted to 
scenarios where there is a official transfer of title to a property but can also include 
certain forms of interference by a state with property rights. IIAs reflect the concept that 
expropriation and nationalisation can take place in many forms which include notions 
such as “indirect” expropriation or action that is “tantamount” to expropriation. For 
example, Article III (1) of the BIT between El Salvador and the United States reads:338 
 
Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization 
(‘expropriation’) except … 
 
Similarly, NAFTA in Article 1110 (1) states: 
 
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization 
or expropriation of such an investment (‘expropriation’) except: … 
 
It has been suggested that a “direct” expropriation is characterised by acts that 
transfer title and physical possession, whereas “indirect” expropriation involves acts that 
effectuate the loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation in the 
value, of assets. 339  The Free Trade Agreements between Singapore and the United 
States340 and between Chile and the United States341 provide that an establishment of 
whether an act or series of acts comprise indirect expropriation necessitates a case-by-
case inquiry. This would be done based on judging the economic impact of the measure, 
the extent to which the government action infringes reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the government action. In addition, it is specified that 
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non-discriminatory regulatory actions are applied only in special circumstances where 
legitimate public welfare objectives are involved. It is not plausible to derive a definition 
for these terms from international tribunal arbitrations. 
The broad scope of the notion of expropriation used in the IIAs (arising from the 
references to indirect expropriation and processes with similar effects) has raised about 
the question of whether compensable expropriation of foreign investment would be the 
result of a state exercising its regulatory powers in matters of trade, taxation, and public 
health. As a result, in addition to the concepts of direct and indirect expropriation, the 
literature often employs the concept of "regulatory takings". One suggested definition is 
that regulatory takings "are those takings of property that fall within the police powers of 
a state, or otherwise arise from measures like those pertaining to the regulation of the 
environment, health, morals, culture or economy of a host country."342 Nevertheless IIAs 
do not unequivocally use the phrase “regulatory takings”; such takings are included under 
the broad scope of indirect expropriation. In the context of the OECD negotiations on a 
MAI, a statement was adopted by OECD Ministers to the effect that “the MAI will not 
inhibit the exercise of the normal regulatory powers of government and that the exercise 
of such powers will not amount to expropriation.”343  
The concept of indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulatory 
governmental measures as two distinct notions has not been systematically articulated.344 
Nevertheless, tribunals when providing their findings in many awards have found various 
criteria in order to distinguish these concepts:345 “i) the degree of interference with the 
property right; ii) the character of governmental measures (ex: the purpose and the 
context of the measure); iii) the interference of the measure with reasonable and 
investment-backed expectations.” In addition to the criteria determined via the 
jurisprudence whether an indirect expropriation has occurred, the state practice is also 
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significant in relation to this issue. Accordingly, recently signed FTAs establish explicitly 
a list of what represents an indirect expropriation:346 
 
The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact 
situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by case, fact-based 
inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
 
(i)  the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or 
series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred; 
 
(ii)  the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
 
(iii)  the character of the government action. 
 
Furthermore, these FTAs address the borderline between indirect expropriation and the 
right to regulate:347 
 
Except in rare circumstances, non discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations. 
  
These criteria are consistent with those emerging from arbitral decisions. Such a 
detailed list of criteria provides a significant assistance when determining whether an 
indirect expropriation requiring compensation has occurred. 
The question of when a state regulation becomes an expropriation has arisen in 
connection with several arbitration proceedings in particular under the investment chapter 
of the NAFTA. 
  
(b) Expropriation-related arbitral awards 
 
A review of above past arbitral awards demonstrates that when challenged by a 
claim that a host state measures are an expropriation, tribunals have approached the issue 
in diverse ways. 
                                                 
346
 US-Australia Free Trade Agreement, above 259, Annex 11-B, Article 4(b); US-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, above n 341, annex 10-D; US-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (signed 28 
January 2004 between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) Annex 10-C; US-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement (signed 15 June 2004) Annex 10-B. 
347
 Ibid. 
 78
− The first approach ignores the host states’ need for policy space. This 
approach places investment protection in a position of primacy and refuses 
to consider the policy reasons underlying the challenged measures taken 
by the host state 
− The second approach is prepared to be aware of the public policy aim of 
the challenged measure but requires a rational relationship of 
proportionality between the weights the measure places on the investor 
and the public interest aim of the measure. 
− The third approach does not treat the public policy aim of the challenged 
measure as a criterion to be weighed against the burden on the investor, 
but rather a determining factor which prevents the measure being an 
expropriatory measure.  
 
Hence, in its 2000 award the tribunal in Metalclad v Mexico took the view that the 
purpose of a measure depriving an investor of the benefit of its investment is irrelevant to 
whether or not the measure may amount to an expropriation.348 The measures at issue in 
Metalclad were a decision by the municipal authority not to grant a permit to operate a 
hazardous waste site and a subsequent government decree declaring the site part of a 
nature reserve for the protection of rare cacti.  
The second approach is illustrated by the case of Técnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed S.A v Mexico which also concerned a permit for a hazardous waste site in 
Mexico.349 In that case Tecmed commenced ICSID arbitration proceedings alleging that 
the Mexican government's failure to re-license its hazardous waste site was an 
expropriation in breach of the Spain-Mexico BIT. In its analysis the tribunal stated:350  
 
The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign power within the framework 
of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as 
administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable 
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However, in deciding whether or not the conduct of Mexico was an expropriation 
requiring the investor to be compensated, the tribunal drew on jurisprudence from the 
European Court of Human Rights, which has held that:351 
 
Not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, on the facts as 
well as in principle, a legitimate aim  “in the public interest”, but there must also be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised.... The requisite balance will not be found if the person 
concerned has had to bear “an individual and excessive burden” … The Court 
considers that a measure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not 
disproportionate thereto. 
 
After a lengthy analysis, the Tecmed tribunal found that Mexico’s conduct did 
amount to an expropriation in that case. 
The third approach is demonstrated by the Methanex Corporation v United States 
award.352 The decision is important in a number of respects, but the most significant for 
present purposes is its approach to the allegation of Methanex that the state of 
California’s ban on MTBE was a measure tantamount to expropriation within Article 
1110 of NAFTA. In dismissing the claim of Methanex, the tribunal held:353 
 
In the Tribunal's view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally discriminatory 
regulation against a foreign investor fulfils a key requirement for establishing 
expropriation. But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, 
which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the 
regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating 
investment that the government would refrain from such regulation. 
 
It held that the United States had made no such commitments to Methanex. The 
tribunal ultimately dismissed all of the claims of Methanex and ordered Methanex to pay 
the costs of the arbitration as well as the United States’ legal costs. In its amicus curiae, 
the IISD suggests that one of the possible categories of expropriation included under 
Article 1110 of NAFTA is “the disputed notion of regulatory taking, whereby the 
diminution of economic value due to a regulation that protects the public interest 
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becomes the basis for a finding of expropriation.”354  In the Methanex case, the United 
States have held about this issue that: 355   
It is a principle of customary international law that, where economic injury results from 
bona fide regulation within the police powers of a State, compensation is not required… 
Thus, as a general matter, States are not liable to compensate aliens for economic loss 
incurred as a result of nondiscriminatory action to protect the public health. 
 
The IISD stresses that welfare measures taken in good faith are outside the notion 
of expropriation since they are measures that clearly falls into the police powers of a 
state.356 Therefore, no compensation shall be rewarded.357  
The approach taken by the Methanex tribunal was affirmed and elaborated upon 
in the 2006 award in Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic.358 Saluka claimed that the 
placing of the bank in forced administration was a deprivation under article 5 of the BIT. 
In its 2006 award, the tribunal agreed with Saluka that the government had breached the 
fair and equitable treatment standard with respect to its conduct prior to the forced 
administration. However, it held that the forced administration did not amount to a 
deprivation under article 5 of the BIT. The tribunal noted that article 5 does not contain 
any explicit exception for the exercise of regulatory power.359 It continued:360  
 
However, in using the concept of deprivation, Article 5 imports into the Treaty the 
customary international law notion that a deprivation can be justified if it results 
from the exercise of regulatory actions aimed at the maintenance of public order. In 
interpreting a treaty, account has to be taken of “any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties” a requirement which the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held includes relevant rules of general 
customary international law.  
 
The tribunal added:361  
 
It is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory 
powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are 
aimed at the general welfare. 
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Although the tribunals in Methanex and Saluka clearly recognize host states’ right 
to policy space, as noted by the Saluka tribunal:362 
 
…international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion 
precisely what regulations are considered “permissible” and “commonly accepted” as 
falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, thus, non-compensable. 
In other words, it has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line between 
non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, measures that have 
the effect of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus unlawful 
and compensable in international law. 
 
The Saluka tribunal held that:363 
 
It thus inevitably falls to the adjudicator to determine whether particular conduct by a 
state “crosses the line that separates valid regulatory activity from expropriation. 
Faced with the question of when, how and at what point an otherwise valid 
regulation becomes, in fact and effect, an unlawful expropriation, international 
tribunals must consider the circumstances in which the question arises. The context 
within which an impugned measure is adopted and applied is critical to the 
determination of its validity. 
 
Unfortunately for host states, this means that even on the most progressive of 
approaches, there still remains a lack of clarity over the circumstances in which a public 
policy measure will be considered expropriatory. This reinforces the need for clearly-
worded provisions addressing this point to be included in the treaties themselves. 
 
Section A has provided a detailed overview of how state regulations regarding 
tax, environment, labour and expropriation are regulated in modern investment treaties, 
including the underlying policy issues that are reflected in the tension between 
international controls, on the one hand, and state sovereignty on the other. The awards 
discussed above demonstrate a growing recognition of the need to allow host states their 
policy space. These positive signs must be read carefully however. Many tribunals 
continue to issue decisions without any reference to host state policy space and only a 
few mention it. Moreover, the lack of a doctrine of precedent means that more promising 
decisions may not be followed by tribunals in the future. The only way to ensure that a 
tribunal will take the need for policy space into account is by including express 
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provisions in the treaty itself. Further suggestions for finding ways of avoiding 
inconsistency in the awards rendered by arbitral tribunals need to be analysed. 
 
B The Right to Regulate in International Investment Agreements 
 
From this discussion of the interaction of state policies with substantive 
investment obligations, a central question arises: how could host states amend the 
existing language of treaties in order to avoid a conflict between their ability to 
implement regulatory measures in the public interest and their duty not to breach the 
rights of investors in the future? In this section, some solutions will be suggested. A new 
treaty language appears necessary in the light of the challenge that arbitral tribunals face 
regarding the consistency of their awards. 
 
1 Alternative formulations for a new treaty language 
 
A new definition of the right to regulate in IIAs seems to be required when 
addressing the issue of the public welfare legislation of host states. In this light, 
UNCTAD has listed three main approaches which have emerged from the IIA negotiating 
practice of a small but growing number of countries:364 
 
(a) Some countries have clarified individual IIA provisions, where there was concern that 
an expansive interpretation could diminish regulatory flexibility of host countries. This 
has happened with regard to provisions guaranteeing fair and equitable treatment of 
investment and the definition of an indirect expropriation. 
 
(b) Numerous recent IIAs include stronger emphasis on public policy concerns in order to 
ensure that investment protection is not pursued at the expense of other legitimate 
public interests. For example, they include exceptions for host country measures to 
maintain national security, preserve the public order or to protect public health, safety 
or the environment. Exceptions have been met with the concern that they may 
undermine the purpose of the IIA by providing the host country with a potentially 
broad justification for derogating from IIAs obligations. In addition, such provisions 
have been the subject of a few arbitral awards and thus their scope is not yet widely 
understood. Other IIAs include provisions calling upon host countries not to depart 
from labour or environmental standards in attracting foreign investment, though often 
these provisions impose no binding obligation. 
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(c) A few IIAs have strengthened the public’s role in investor-State dispute resolution by 
providing for greater transparency in proceedings, open hearings, publication of related 
legal documents, and allowing civil society representatives to submit amicus curiae 
briefs to tribunals. 
 
 
(a)  The use of the preamble clauses 
 
A widespread characteristic of arbitration decisions under IIAs is reference to the 
preamble and objective clauses of such agreements.365 These are used, consistent with the 
general rules on treaty interpretation under international law, as an interpretive aid for the 
substantive provision of the treaty.366  
To date the preamble and objectives of IIAs have focused on the protection of the 
investor as the basis for attracting higher levels of investment.367 Hardly any actually 
contain references to such matters as protection of the environment, sustainable 
development, protection of human health or the need for recognition of the right or duty 
of states to regulate, for example.368 Hence, most arbitral decisions have focused on the 
object and purpose of protecting the investor as the principle interpretive guide to to the 
substantive provisions of the IIA.369  
Nevertheless, this is not always the case. A growing number of IIAs include 
references to issues beyond the protection of the investors. In this light, the Preamble of 
NAFTA reads:370 
 
The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the 
Government of the United States of America, resolved to: 
 
[…] 
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working conditions and living 
standards in their respective territories; 
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental 
protection and conservation; 
PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare; 
PROMOTE sustainable development: 
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STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations; 
and 
PROTECT, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights. 
 
 
This example emphasises the fact that there are alternatives available for 
negotiators to move beyond the previous restricted statements of entirely economic 
objectives, whether in a preamble or in an objectives clause, to summarise the 
relationship of investments to the host state in a broader way.371 When these concerns are 
dealt with in the preamble or an objectives clause, it enhances the probability that a 
tribunal called upon to construe the substantive clauses will take a more unprejudiced 
view of them.372 If the regulatory rights of states are expressly recognised in a preamble 
or objectives clause, it can also improve the chances that the police powers rule, even if 
not expressly referred to in the clause, will be cited as an interpretational guide to any 
provision on expropriation.373 
 
(b) The inclusion of regulatory measures articles 
 
Another option is to include in the substantive provisions of an IIA specific 
references to the regulatory rights or duties of states.374 Whilst still not frequent there are 
at least a handful of examples of this.375 
When included in the substantive section of a treaty it is possible for such articles 
to have a considerable impact on a tribunal’s elucidation of a treaty.376 It is a fundamental 
concept in treaty interpretation that each clause must be interpreted in the context of the 
other provisions in the treaty.377 The express recognition of a state’s right to regulate 
investments will have to be taken into account when interpreting the other substantive 
provisions.378   
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Possibly the most general example of such an approach is found in the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) which includes the conventional investor protection provisions 
found in all IIAs and also includes two special provisions relating to regulation, one on 
the sovereign right to regulate in general379 and one more precisely to the environment:380 
this emphasises the necessity of recognising the prospect of future regulation in the 
context of an IIA. 
It is critical to be conscious of the so-called regulatory exception clauses, which 
can be misleading. Article 1114 of NAFTA, titled Environmental Measures states: 
 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in 
a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
 
The issue with this article is that it has no legal implications, even though it 
appears to generate a broad exclusion for environmental law measures distinctively.381  It 
does nothing to protect a government against a claim that a measure is a breach of the 
Chapter. None of NAFTA’s three parties have accorded the provision much weight.382 
One may note that there is a principal focus on environmental regulatory issues in 
many of the case studies we have looked at before.383 Without a doubt, this is a reflection 
of very outspoken interests of environmental NGOs in the 1990s, when the issues first 
came to public attention.384 In recent times partnership between countries has been more 
specifically focused on investment agreements, unlike before when there were certain 
restrictions put on developing countries (preventing imposition of environmental 
standards).385 The importance of guaranteeing developing nations policy space, however, 
is not limited to environmental measures but also concerns other public welfare issues.386 
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(c) General exclusions 
 
General exclusions may be found in three types of annexes in various investment 
treaties, namely the exclusion of specific sectors from some or all of the obligations of 
the IIA,387 the exclusion of measures from the obligations of the IIA,388 and finally the 
exclusion of future measures from the obligations of the IIA.389  
The probability of such exclusions is based on the level of broadly-based 
exclusions; this may include issues that can lead to claims of expropriation or other 
obligations. Nevertheless it should be noted that such an approach must not be misused as 
a means of circumventing obligations under an agreement.  
 Many agreements include precise provisions excluding certain types of measures, 
like taxation measures.390 There are multiple examples of this, such as the Colombia 
Model BIT, Article II.4: “The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to tax 
matters.” The possibility to include provisions in a text that also excludes other types of 
government measures can be looked at with the use of the above example.391 Specific 
exclusions like that of environmental protection measures excluded from indirect 
expropriation are not prevalent except for taxation measures but are a definite 
possibility.392  
It is noteworthy that among the BITs concluded in the last decade, general 
exception clauses are more often included. The rationale for a general exception is to 
exempt a contracting party from the obligations of the BIT in situations in which 
compliance would be incompatible with key policy objectives explicitly identified in the 
agreement. The exceptions cover a wide variety of policy objectives, including taxation, 
essential security and public order, protection of human health and the environment, and 
more. The more frequent use of exception clauses reflects a tendency to give more weight 
to certain public policy concerns in connection with BITs. Most often, for a general 
exception to be permitted, the otherwise inconsistent measure by the contracting party 
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must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis. Therefore, general exceptions ensure that 
the BIT obligations do not prevent the country concerned from applying its domestic 
legislation in order to safeguard any of these fundamental values. Another approach taken 
in some BITs is to emphasise that investment promotion and protection must not be 
pursued at the expense of other key policy objectives, particularly in the area of public 
health and safety, environmental protection and respect of core labour rights. 
However, these provisions suffer from a certain normative weakness insofar as 
they do not clearly identify to what extent the protection of investments is limited for the 
sake of legitimate public policy. Thus, the interpretative clause mentioned above will 
legitimise environmental policies which are “in addition in conformity with the present 
agreement”. Consequently, this clause loses all of its strength since it is considered only 
once the court has determined that a measure of the host state did not violate the rights of 
the investor. In addition, the concerned clauses limit their field of application to certain 
public policies. This could be interpreted a contrario as providing a way to restrict the 
others in the name of the protection of investments. 
A complex form of exclusion clause seen in the use of general exception clause is 
modelled on Article XX of the GATT.393 An example of such a clause is found in Article 
13 of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Investment: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on investment flows, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member 
State of measures; (a) necessary to protect national security and public morals; (b) 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (…) 
 
The essence of the text is unclear as it raises issues of discrimination between 
countries where similar conditions exist.394 Such a provision would predominantly be for 
measures ratified by a single government within its own borders and has no connection to 
the conditions in other countries.395 
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(d) Clarity of key standards 
 
It is critical to note that there is an increasing need for IIAs to be clear.396 Various 
BITs which have been signed in the past are examples of growing complexity of IIAs; 
more recently there have been many agreements between developed and developing 
nations.397  
Arguments based on the standards of fair and equitable treatment, national 
treatment and most-favoured nation treatment have arisen as a result of the implications 
of trade law. In many cases, investors have argued that a comparison of foreign and 
domestic investors has shown that many of their interests have not been served, though 
they seem to be treated the same way as other investors.398 This gives rise to argument 
from investors against states’ measures based on many factors such as geographical 
location, environmental impacts, and human health and so on.399  
 
2 Promotion of consistency in investment arbitration 
 
Is there consistency of results in arbitration today and how can consistency be 
improved?400 
A few solutions are treaty or fact-based. It must be recognised that there are 
intrinsic inconsistencies in any legal system. Questions of whether similar answers are 
being given to similar questions arise all the time, which provokes one to reflect on the 
relationship between law and application of following precedents.401 Legal theory claims 
that we have the obligation to strive towards consistency and predictability because of the 
notion that the rule of law requires law to be consistently applied by following 
precedents.402  
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This obligation is not consistent in all fields of law.403  The less developed a legal 
system is, the greater the importance of whoever must resolve disputes. Investment law is 
in its early stages and definitely calls for greater level of consistency, although no 
doctrine of precedent exists as such in investment arbitration.404  
From the above, it is clear that the use of precedents is the best route by which 
investment law is to achieve consistency. For such precedents to promote consistency, 
tribunals would have to methodically base themselves on a consistent line of cases and 
shift only for compelling reasons.405 As time goes by, this practice could evolve into a 
rule of customary international law.406 
 
C  Interim Conclusion 
 
Drafting a provision that adequately addresses the issues of the protection of the 
foreign investor, and the ability of the host state to govern its economy can pose a 
challenge. Although some IIAs have sought to list the regulatory measures the exercise of 
which will not amount to taking, the compilation of an exhaustive list is a difficult, if not 
impossible, task. Instead, takings clauses as well as tax, environmental and labour 
provisions could be drafted to reflect the formulation of a certain relationship that can 
accommodate both the concerns of foreign investors and national policy makers.  The 
various policy options expressed above require the need to strike a balance between the 
level of investment protection, on the one hand, and the level of discretion retained by the 
host state in adopting measures that affect foreign investments, on the other hand. 
However, with respect to the question of countries balancing the immediate economic 
impact sought from FDI, and core national welfare measures, some controversy might 
exist. In order to deal with this debate, the following questions need to be answered 
during negotiations of the parties of a new investment treaty: 
- To what extent could IIAs in general contribute to public welfare in the light of 
specialised instruments dealing with the different public policies analysed above?  
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- Where IIAs address these concerns, should standards be included?  
- If so, how are these standards defined, to who are they addressed, and should they 
be binding or non-binding?  
- How will they interact with standards contained in specialised instruments on the 
same matters? 
The discussion of these questions will also require a balancing of at least two sets 
of arguments. First, the prescription of certain standards in some circumstances amounts 
to a form of disguised protectionism. Secondly, that the need to promote certain tax, 
environmental, employment, and privatisation standards may outweigh certain negative 
impacts on trade or investment growth.  
The extension of the imposition of certain national regulatory measures that could 
constitute compensable expropriation has been well-addressed by Thomas Wälde and 
Abba Kolo. The authors stated:407 
 
 The investment rules will therefore have to impact on the way the broad environmental principles 
are interpreted and applied, and the environmental principles will play a role in legitimizing 
regulation subject to the scrutiny of the investment protection rules. Both set of rules, conceptual 
approaches and values … have to merge under the sign of mutual respect. 
 
Such an explanation could be extended to all regulatory public measures taken by 
the host state. In this light, a need for a practice of partnership between the host state and 
the investor arises. 
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CHAPTER IV LOGIC OF SOVEREIGNTY TO A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN 
HOST STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 
 
Host states have different options to resolve the tension between international 
security of investments and the public policies constrained by this security. Host states 
can choose to respond to the challenge with a sovereign mindset: as a “power-state” 
acting in a unilateral manner towards private persons, including foreign investors, and 
only consulting with other states. This sovereign approach would consist either of 
following public policies while violating, if the need arises, commitments made under 
international investment law or trying to change amend international investment law by 
agreement with other contracting states. The first approach ought to be dismissed as it is 
less likely to take place given the interest of states in attracting investments. The idea of 
amending international investment law, however, deserves to be explored. 
The host state can also advocate certain alternative methods of public partnership, 
adopting a cooperation perspective towards investors. In this light, several policy tools 
will be under focus. The precise measure must without a doubt be defined on a case by 
case basis, but the idea of cooperation is promising. Finally, the author suggests that the 
best way to ensure a balanced state-investor partnership is perhaps via including a general 
provision in the preamble of every IIA which considers the right to a security of 
international investment without threatening host states regulatory power.  
 
A The Natural Sovereign Temptation: Reduction of the Security of Investment 
Agreements 
 
Adopting a sovereign mindset, a host state might require the renegotiation of 
existing security agreements, and change its requirements for future agreements of this 
kind. A host state might want to rule out state-investor arbitration, reduce the scope of 
protective provisions or make provision for a general exception. None of these options 
are satisfying. 
 
1 Rejection of arbitration: an inappropriate response 
 
 92
(a) The withdrawal of Ecuador from ICSID 
 
The role of ICSID can be explained by means of case studies, especially from 
Latin America. In the early 1990s, President Sixtó Durán Ballén implemented a series of 
measures which helped Ecuador open its doors to Foreign Trade and Capital. Many 
significant developments followed, including the admission of Ecuador to the World 
Trade Organisation, the signature of various BITs and, most importantly, an increase in 
FDI, tripling in the two years between 1992 and 1994; the FDI further doubled between 
1996 and 1998.408 This trend became unstable after his presidency.409 The instability of 
FDI in the country grew after the currency (the sucre) was demonetised in the late 
1990s.410 
By 2006 Rafael Correa assumed office as the new President of Ecuador. By this 
time Ecuador was concluding its negotiations on a free trade agreement with the United 
States.411 This process stalled, however, because of the new hydrocarbons law requiring 
the revision of contract terms. 412  This was followed by the seizure of assets from 
Occidental Petroleum who was at this time the largest investor in Ecuador.413 The acts of 
the Correa administration led to one of the largest claims ever filed before the ICSID.414 
Correa’s administration announced a decision to impose new taxes on foreign oil 
companies, by ordering them to pay 99% of their income to the government.415 As a 
result of this in the first half of 2008 almost six major oil companies filed claims against 
Ecuador at the ICSID.416 
On 4 December 2007, Ecuador informed ICSID formally that it would not give 
consent to ICSID in matters relating to the treatment of investments in economic 
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activities that concern the exploitation of natural resources of the country.417  Such a 
notification was based on Article 25(4) of the Washington Convention which states: 
 
Any contracting state may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this 
convention or at any time thereafter, notify the centre of the class or classes of disputes 
which it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The 
Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all contracting states. Such 
notification shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph (1). 
             
          The withdrawal of Ecuador from the ICSID constrains the scope of the jurisdiction 
of the Centre. An example of such a case is Československa Obchodni Banka, a.s. v The 
Slovak Republic.418  If a contracting state wishes to exclude a particular investment from 
the reach of the Convention, Article 25(4) provides a more appropriate way to do so 
rather than defying the meaning of the term ”investment” under the Convention.419 The 
tribunal articulated that the acceptance of such jurisdiction with respect to the terms and 
obligations arising out of their agreement creates a strong presumption that they deemed 
their transaction to be an investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention.420  
 
Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal stated that:421  
 
It is worth noting, in this connection, that a Contracting State that wishes to limit the 
scope of the Centre’s jurisdiction can do so by making the declaration provided for in 
Article 25(4) of the Convention. The Slovak Republic has not made such a declaration 
and has, therefore, submitted itself broadly to the full scope of the subject matter 
jurisdiction governed by the Convention. 
                  
          Applying the reasoning of the tribunal to Ecuador, after the notification on the 4 
December 2007, the country has limited the scope of the jurisdiction of the Centre in 
disputes.422 By restraining the scope of the ICSID jurisdiction in disputes arising out of 
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natural resource investments, including oil, and gas, and other minerals, Ecuador might 
no longer be taken to arbitration in these types of cases.423  
         An important legal issue in the context of exclusion from the ICSID is whether it 
can be used on an ex post facto basis.424 This issue is addressed in Alcoa Minerals 
Jamaica v Jamaica.425 In 1968 Alcoa Minerals entered into an investment contract with 
Jamaica for the construction of a refining plant, in exchange for a series of tax 
concessions including a ‘no-further-tax’ provision, and a right to long term bauxite 
mining.426 This agreement included an important ICSID arbitration provision.427 In 1974, 
the Jamaican government announced a unilateral increase in the tax on mining bauxite.428 
Since the parties could not reach an agreement on this development, the government 
imposed a new tax by enacting the Bauxite Act which dramatically increased the tax on 
mining of bauxite.429  However, prior to the enactment of Bauxite Act, the Jamaican 
government notified the Centre in accordance with Article 25(4) of the exclusion of 
disputes arising from investments and related to natural resources.430 For this reason, 
when Alcoa decided to bring a claim against Jamaica before ICSID, Jamaica, relying on 
Article 25(4), did not appear before the ICSID Tribunal.431 However, the Tribunal found 
jurisdiction by deciding the issue of whether the notification of Jamaica had the effect of 
withdrawing natural resources investment disputes from the scope of Jamaica’s prior 
consent to arbitrate.432 
The tribunal ruling on the authority to arbitrate in this case is critical today.433 The 
tribunal held that the agreement of the parties to an ICSID arbitration provision fulfilled 
the condition of consent required by Article 25(1), which may not be withdrawn 
thereafter.434 A decision finding otherwise “would very largely, if not wholly, deprive the 
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Convention of any practical value.”435  The Alcoa decision shows the success of the 
ICSID Convention in dealing with such problems is a guarantee to the many investors 
presently dependent on ICSID arbitration provisions.436 
The jurisdictional outcome of such cases is extremely important for the 
Ecuadorian economy, as well as ICSID arbitration. 437  If the ICSID tribunals find 
jurisdiction in these cases, Ecuador may be facing an economic crisis.438 These eventual 
decisions, as happened with the Alcoa case in the 1970s, may enhance and secure the 
reliable performance of investment agreements by showing that foreign investment need 
not be subject to national impulse which bodes well for ICSID in the near future.439  
 
 
(b) The effect of investment protection provisions in FTAs 
 
The Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Australia,440 which also 
contains a chapter about investment was the first FTA concluded since the entry into 
effect of NAFTA.441 This agreement does not include a provision for arbitration between 
the investor and the host state.442 Rather than including a direct investor-state arbitration 
provision, Article 11.16(1) of the United States-Australia FTA provides that the parties 
can enter into consultations “with a view towards allowing an investor of a party to 
submit a dispute to arbitration”.443 Australia contended that its domestic legal system was 
sufficiently capable of dealing with private sector claims.444 Yet, subsequent FTAs and 
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BITs signed by the United States retain provision for direct investor-state procedures.445 
Consequently, the United States exceptionally accept the lack of direct investor-state 
procedures in FTAs.446 This view might be justified when the FTA is signed with a 
developed country and which has according to some authors “a legal system developed 
enough to comfort US investors.”447 
It might be argued that this approach has the advantage of freeing the state from 
unwanted international investment jurisprudence. There are more convincing arguments 
to the contrary, however. Legally, the elimination of the state-investor arbitration 
provision does not change the obligations of the host state on the substance. It only 
eliminates a particular aspect of dispute settlement. In the absence of state-investor 
arbitration, other settlement methods will be required, possibly including inter-state 
resolution via diplomatic protection. In that case, the home state of the investor defends 
its national by asserting its own right to internationally lawful treatment of its nationals. 
The dispute then becomes inter-state. Nothing prevents the state of origin of the investor 
from taking the side of its citizen, since he does not enjoy any recourse under his name. 
Consequently, there would be an unwelcome re-politicisation of international investment 
disputes, while the depoliticisation of investment arbitrations is precisely one of the 
advantages of the arbitration procedure between state and foreign investor.448  
Lastly, owing to the principle of reciprocity inherent in investment treaties, 
developed states which choose to give up state-investor arbitration (a decision based upon 
belief in a domestic justice system which is supposed to be efficient) will realise that their 
own citizens hoping to invest abroad will from now on face a difficult situation in terms 
of protection. Nationals of a developed state could not use arbitration against the host 
(developing) state and would have to assert their rights against the host state in the 
context of an inadequate judicial system. It would result in a loss of international 
competitiveness of investors from concerned states since insurance for political risks for 
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their investment activity abroad will not be granted absent an international arbitration 
mechanism, or only on strongly disadvantageous terms. 
2 The mistake of trying to narrow the scope of fundamental provisions  
 
The state which lowers the content and the scope of provisions contained in the 
investment agreement will face significant obstacles.449  On one hand, the host state alone 
would not proceed with this decrease: the state requires the agreement of the other Parties 
to the convention. Yet, it is uncertain that the other Party has the same interests in this 
respect.  
 In addition, even if a host state succeeds in negotiating an investment treaty with 
decreased protection for investments, most-favoured nation clauses still require the state 
to extend under each treaty any more favourable provisions included in other investment 
agreements negotiated by the host state. Every BIT of a state should be amended in order 
to avoid such a phenomenon – it seems to be a practical challenge, to say the least. Even 
if the conventions are negotiated by experts that generally come from various 
departments of economy and with all the professionalism and performance that it implies, 
the ratification procedure of a bilateral convention from one part and another has, as a 
consequence, that these texts do not come into force until a year after the end of 
negotiations. When states are faced with competitive situations, they have a propensity to 
attract investments but it might be at the cost of reducing the level of protection 
guaranteed in their agreements. The solution does not seem to be particularly practical in 
the absence of a multilateral agreement of investment. The only effect of a decrease of 
the level of security would be to worry potential investors as well as their insurance 
company. 
 
3 The inappropriate suggestion of a general exception provision 
 
 Another solution theoretically conceivable to eliminate the dilemma between the 
international security of investments and public policies, but likely to cause damage to 
investors, is a part of substantive law. This solution would consist of including a general 
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exception clause in international instruments. Such a provision would act as an exception 
from the obligation of the host state to offer to the investment the level of protection in 
theory guaranteed. Therefore, general exceptions for public policy measures would not 
constitute a breach of the BIT. In this respect, the United States Model BIT of 2004 
makes clear what measures would not cause a breach:450 “Except in rare circumstances, 
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment do 
not constitute indirect expropriations.” 
 The authors of future treaties of protection of the investments could be tempted, in 
this respect, to draw their inspiration from the existing international law. Indeed, Article 
XX of the GATT is the general exceptions article that provides possibilities to impose 
trade-restrictive measures for internationally recognised, important policy objectives. 
GATT Article XX(g) deals with the general exception of measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” and Article XX(b) provides a general 
exception for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”.451 
GATT Article XX also applies to other functional agreements concluded within the WTO 
(TRIPS, TRIMS, and SPS). The GATT has its own exception provision (Article XIV). 
The WTO system is therefore covered by this possibility of derogation. 
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  Such a provision has already been transposed to international investment law 
especially at the regional level. In fact, several free trade agreements enclose sections on 
general exceptions. As a rule, parties opt to copy the general exception articles verbatim 
into their FTAs or simply incorporate Article XX GATT in their goods regime and 
Article XIV GATS in their services regime. This approach is translated into reality in the 
Australia-United States FTA, 452  the NAFTA, 453  the Chile-European Free Trade 
Association FTA (Chile-EFTA FTA)454 and the very recent New Zealand-China FTA455  
to cite only a few. One can assume that this kind of provision would indeed allow host 
states to persist in the good management of their domestic affairs, to answer in a 
controlled way to environmental demands and social protection while still maintaining 
the international security of investments.  
 However, it is rare for IIAs to include provisions with a same wording. It might 
result in an inconsistent interpretation made by tribunals in regulatory matters. In 
addition, international investment law is fundamentally different to the law of the WTO: 
it is a prescriptive system protecting private persons, whereas the WTO deals with inter-
state relationships. While it is possible to make states that bear prejudicial economic 
consequences of their respective general interest policies, this logic does not correspond 
well to the asymmetrical context of international investment law as set out in the WTO. 
Therefore, a general exception provision would have two disadvantages in this particular 
context. First of all it could have perverse consequences. Indeed, the provision would 
lead to the financing of local public policies by foreign investors subjected to the 
implementation of the provision. Indeed, the value of the investment would immediately 
be dependent of every exception to the standard protection under the treaty. Such a forced 
private financing of policies is only recognised as legitimate if it undertaken through the 
tax system. The main domestic systems of law indeed reject every attempt of the state to 
take its private goods and assets without compensation, even for the most legitimate ends. 
That logic must continue to apply as well to the international context. Second of all, 
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including a general exception provision might be creating a counterproductive incentive. 
Influenced by their domestic political opinion, host states would be tempted to invoke the 
exception provision on a frequent and exaggerated basis. Any such tendency would 
obviously be supervised by arbitral jurisprudence but the state has de facto a “preliminary 
privilege” particularly extended in international investment law.  
B The Need for a Partnership in International Investments 
 
Significant efforts expended by states to defend their cause before international 
arbitral authorities (unlike the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, where the states, 
respondents in a good number of arbitrations in relation to nationalisations taking place at 
this time, refused to participate in arbitral procedures). Host states today participate 
prominently at this level and hire prominent experts. The cost of receiving advice from 
such experts is in contrast with an excessive administrative strictness at the hands of 
foreign investors at the starting dispute. This measure is therefore very costly because it 
involves procedural costs and in some cases may entail payment of interest. In addition, 
such a strategy puts into peril the good business relationships between the foreign 
investor and the host state and its authorities. It might encourage the tribunal to make a 
more extreme award. As a consequence, international investment law may have a 
particularly disruptive effect on the state; it is often these same states willing to challenge 
the legitimacy of this normative system from an interstate point of view.                                                                   
In order to solve these difficulties, possible decisions that might clash with 
investors’ interests should therefore be analysed and taken in conformity with procedural 
guidelines established by the state itself. These procedural guidelines must, in turn, take 
into account the particularity of the relationships. Effectively, the foreign investor is no 
longer subject to the authorities of the host state according to the traditional 
administrative law meaning. It is in the states’ interest take account of this evolution and 
its consequences. This dissertation aims to suggest some ways, or mechanisms, to ensure 
that the normal regulatory power of states will not be found in breach of IIAs. Several 
potential solutions are examined.  
 
1 Promoting good investment governance through transparency 
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 Promoting good investment governance through transparency cannot be ignored 
in order as a means of reorganising relationships between host states and foreign 
investors. 456  Indeed, transparency constitutes a core principle of international policy. As 
such, public sector transparency is an instrument for achieving goals such as enhancing 
the effectiveness of political processes, reducing policy uncertainty and improving the 
understanding of public policy. Although no commonly agreed definition exists, 
transparency can be defined as the obligation binding on local authorities to communicate 
their political goals, justify their decisions and make accessible to foreign investors all the 
relevant texts that concern them. This requirement is designed to allow investors to 
become easily informed, at less cost, about the regulatory context of their investment 
operation. Various sources provided their own definition of the concept of transparency. 
Therefore, the UNCTAD provides, through the identification of elements of good 
governance in investment promotion, its own definition of transparency:457  
 
The interface between government and investors is most effective when there is timely 
information disclosure, easy availability of information and a helpdesk for investors. 
Transparency also implies greater openness to the media and the public on investment 
policies and practices. 
 
UNCTAD goes on to detail the concept of transparency as well as the possible means by 
which it can be achieved:458  
 
It is important to ensure that the text of a law or regulation is easily available to those it is 
primarily addressed to. One problem faced by foreign investors in some countries, which 
has a bearing on transparency, is that laws are enacted in a local language not spoken at 
the international business level. Having authoritative investment guides in internationally 
recognized languages that bring together in one publication the basic requirements for 
setting up and operating a business in a country is one way to address that problem. In 
this regard, UNCTAD has cooperated with the International Chambers of Commerce 
(ICC) to produce a series of Investment Guides for LDCs. 
 
Information technology (IT) and the Internet are effective tools for increasing 
transparency in the investment regime and informing investors and the public of expected 
changes in laws, regulations and procedures. The Internet could also be used to provide 
on-line question and answer services and to consult investors on new legislation and 
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policies. A 2000 UNCTAD survey showed that 40 per cent of IPAs provide on-line 
services and that most IPAs maintain specialized databases on the business environment, 
investors, useful contacts, etc. However, it should be noted that there are major 
differences between countries and that in this particular survey one-third of the LDC 
IPAs were not connected to the World Wide Web, while two-thirds did not have a home 
page. 
 
The tribunal in Tecmed validates that the predictability component of transparency 
is central to the effective protection of investments. Addressing the obligation within the 
BIT to provide fair and equitable treatment, it held that:459 
 
This provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith principle established by 
international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments 
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act 
in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with 
the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that 
will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and 
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with 
such regulations. 
 
 
States with more transparent policy environments will not only attract foreign 
investors but also improve the accountability of both actors.  
Furthermore, the OECD has drawn from several international, regional and 
bilateral agreements a compilation of core transparency measures for the international 
investment community. Thus, three main transparency measures were identified:460 
 
- Provision of information on policies of interest to international investors. … It 
includes legislation, administrative rulings, judicial decisions, exceptions to national 
treatment and most favoured nation status, procedures for applying for 
authorisations, administrative practices, privatisation and monopolies. 
- Clear definitions of the limits of transparency obligations (security is the most 
commonly cited exception); and 
- Ensuring that policy information is accessible to international investors and to other 
governments – for example, by notifying the parties of changes to measures, by 
establishing national enquiry points, specialised publications or registers and web 
sites. 
 
One notices that a wide range of measures of universal relevance are contained in 
the different agreements. In order to fulfil transparency commitments, governments need 
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to provide access to information about public sector activity as well as monitor its scope, 
accuracy and information.461  
From the point of view of international law, the advantage of transparency is that 
it prevents a host government from being held responsible for unfair and inequitable 
treatment owing to the excessive opaqueness of its judicial and administrative system and 
to the unpredictable decisions due to it. Governments might still change policy plans 
abruptly. They might lose credibility; hence transparency measures will not have their 
intended effects. From an economic point of view, transparency provides positive effects 
in terms of performance given that the decision-making proceedings become clearer for 
the investor. Thanks to a good mutual understanding between administrative institutions 
and foreign investors, one can anticipate an important growth of investment in the states 
concerned. In addition, resources are granted to investors which comply with the 
expectations of the host state, therefore avoiding immediate losses to capital owners as 
well as the multinationals by a non-operational investment from the country of 
investment.462 Within the WTO, European Communities have indeed responded to a poll 
in which 71% of major European companies questioned considered the lack of 
transparency as a major obstacle to investment in the economy concerned. 
Such a measure does not prevent the host state from changing the normative 
context surrounding the investment, once the latter is established. On the other hand, the 
transparent state sets a framework of rules under which the state will act vis-à-vis people 
subject to its control, whether it is in the form of an act of general application or an 
individual decision. Individuals are bound by rules, which are effective once they are 
made aware of them. Indeed, several international best practice guidelines have emerged 
regarding the access to information about public sector activity linked to basic fiscal, 
legislative and regulatory functions.463  
Implementing this approach seems difficult, however. For example, the 
publication of laws and regulations in a source of easily accessible information has 
dropped even among member states of the OECD and reaches only a disappointing 18 
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countries out of 26 (in 2000), an unchanged number since 1998.464 The situation is even 
more complex in most developing countries which often do not have the means to 
implement transparency criteria without outside help. 465  How can one expect a 
developing country to make every applicable and implemented text available on the 
internet? Projects of ODA (Official Development Assistance) have been launched for this 
purpose.466 This shows that there have been developments. 
The situation is not desperate: Morocco demonstrates that surprising successes are 
possible when it comes to transparency. Thus, thanks to an Investment Charter, the Rabat 
Government established in a precise way the goals of its public action for ten years 
starting from 1995. As a result, foreign investors enjoy a prescriptive stability for the 
policies which are mentioned in this document.467  
 
2 Establishment of a unique administrative office  
 
In the context of recent international investment disputes, investors often rely on 
incoherence between decisions and actions of different competent authorities. 468  In 
particular, the MTD v Chile case 469  provides a good example of how a lack of 
coordination between several public entities can lead to inconsistent decision-making. 
The ICSID tribunal in this case held that Chile had breached the fair and equitable 
treatment obligation under the BIT when it approved MTD’s investment, which was 
inconsistent with the urban policy of the government which consequently barred the 
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construction work. Indirect expropriation was not found in this case, nonetheless, because 
the tribunal agreed with the respondent state that “an investor does not have a right to a 
modification of the laws of the host country.”470 Rather, the tribunal held: 
 
The issue in this case is not of expropriation but unfair treatment by the State when it 
approved an investment against the policy of the State itself. The investor did not have 
the right to the amendment of the PMRS. It is not a permit that has been denied, but a 
change in a regulation. It was the policy of the Respondent and its right not to change it. 
For the same reason, it was unfair to admit the investment in the country in the first place.  
 
The lack of any specific host state commitments to an investor, which would 
create legitimate expectations of the latter, was decisive in the MTD v Chile decision. The 
multiplicity of public actors makes it difficult to implement favourable decisions for 
investors. Thus, central authorities of the host state may approve a project of investment 
but the investor may later face a denial from a local authority.471  However, a plain 
solution, placing all relevant public administrations in the territory of the host state in one 
place would be the creation of a unique public office. Thus, Morocco has made the wise 
choice of creating Regional Centres of Investment which allow the investor to avoid 
drawn-out and costly involvement with administrative authorities. Such a tool is 
completely transferrable to other states, including federal ones. Indeed, no administrative 
authority is bound to give up their competence; they are only put together within the 
same unit. 
In addition to this aspect of accessibility, unique public offices have a noteworthy 
advantage in relation to international investment law: such a system would eliminate the 
possibility of any contradiction between the promises from one administration and the 
later contradictory response of another instance due to a simultaneous consultation. As a 
result, a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard is unlikely to happen. 
 
3 Avoidance of litigation: adoption of an initial consultation with investors 
 
 If the establishment of a unique public office leads to the avoidance of certain 
procedural incoherencies, the content of the decisions taken by the host state can remain 
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uncertain in with the context of international investment law. This field of law not only 
covers the procedural denial of justice but also in-depth public policies.  
Consultations would precede binding administrative decisions that will affect the 
legitimate interests of investors. Thus, the state would avoid being condemned for acts 
that are unpredictable and contrary to legitimate interests of investors. Standardised and 
systematic consultation mechanisms would allow an early start in the policy making 
process in several stages and would without a doubt improve the predictability of the 
public policies concerned. It would be possible to imagine in practice an organ of 
consultation with a sufficient status in the context of the state’s institutions and provided 
with useful protective mechanisms in order to minimise this issue. One can draw 
inspiration from the techniques developed in the context of dialogue in employment 
disputes: 
− The participation of an “employees’” organisation in developing countries, that is 
to say the United Nations or more particularly the UNCTAD in the consultations; 
− The possible intervention of a “third-party facilitator” who is neutral during 
consultations, in the person of a former dignitary upon whom both parties would 
agree. 
The ICSID Convention and Rules make extensive reference to the procedure of 
conciliation. 472  They also make extensive reference to the procedure of conciliation 
which has been sparingly used in spite of its status as equivalent to arbitration tribunals. 
Article 28 is the first Article in the conciliation Chapter and deals with the “Request for 
Conciliation”. Articles 29-31 deal with the “Constitution of the Conciliation 
Commission” and Articles 32-35 with “Conciliation Proceedings”.473 Other systems for 
the settlement of disputes also provide for conciliation. These systems include the 
International Chamber of Commerce 474  and UNCITRAL. 475  Three requests for 
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conciliation under ICSID have been registered so far. The first one was settled before the 
constitution of a conciliation commission. 476  Another led to a successful settlement 
agreed by the parties.477 A third one did not lead to an immediate settlement.478 This 
infrequent use may have its source in the perception that conciliation is likely to be a 
waste of time, effort and money since either party can at any time withdraw from the 
procedure or repudiate a recommendation of the commission.479  The reasons for the 
scarcity of requests for conciliation lie with the perceptions and expectations of the 
parties, especially investors.480  
In any event, a system of consultation would complement the arbitration 
mechanism in ICSID, which takes place after a state-investor conflict, acting as a neutral 
and international organ, involved before litigation ensues and therefore possibly 
preventing it. It would have the double advantage of preventing a number of disputes 
going to arbitration and improving on a permanent basis the relationships between the 
state and investor. An additional benefit of increasing transparency in public decision-
making processes would be to reduce the increasing use of corruption by foreign 
nationals to protect their interests. 
 
4 Host states as true participants in the international investment process 
 
Even if the above suggestions do not affect the domestic sovereignty of host 
states, the management modes suggested would establish an innovative view of relations 
between foreign investor and host government, based on consultation. Such a relationship 
involves mutual commitments between the parties since the consultation would produce 
in a concrete result. A system of contractualisation is therefore necessary to allow both 
parties to plan their action according to a common document. 
This would make the host state a true actor in the market of international 
investments. Indeed, unilateral instruments which are available thanks to domestic 
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administrative law are not adapted anymore. The state is subject to an external control of 
its acts. As a result, in order to maintain some influence and to defend its interests, the 
state must be entirely free to proceed as a partner-negotiator vis-à-vis investors. 
Yet, despite appearances, the possibility of subjecting state-investor relations to 
contract is not necessarily straightforward. Admittedly, state contracts already exist, but 
this system may face obstacles: state sovereignty and, in particular, its relation to its 
natural resources, undermine the compulsory state of the contract since it is concluded for 
a long period. The domestic distribution of competences within the state often prevents it 
from implementing public policy decisions vis-à-vis an external actor like a foreign 
investor, particularly when doing so requires legislative measures or acts by local 
authorities.  
The result is legal insecurity for the investor and embarrassment for a state which 
hopes to consult with an investor, but who does not have the necessary mechanisms to 
ensure such a procedure. A solution would be for the host country try and establish a 
single authority to manage the partnership between the parties.  
The legal form of the authority is not particularly important (a particular 
administration, a public establishment or even a private law society could fulfill the 
function) as long as such an authority was be able to all components of the state 
Administrative law should be adapted in order to allow the host state to act in that way. In 
a federal system, it is moreover about a common establishment of federated and federal 
states. These institutional models exist (see for example coordination organs between 
German Länder like the Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von Studienplätzen or ZVS) and do 
not require a constitutional amendment because the concerned authorities still discharge 
their respective competences. The authority should have the know-how and necessary 
means to be able to complete contractualisation processes as soon as possible; otherwise 
the authority would lose value in relation to the current system. The contracts signed by 
the authority and, if need be, enacted by the Parliament should be compulsory with 
respect to the domestic law of the state at issue and it should be possible to enforce them 
before the tribunals of the concerned state. Finally, the contracts of the authority should 
be based on general conditions which make them valid with regard to international law. 
This would mean that the length of the contract would be limited to a few years. 
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Eventually, this would lead to concluding the contract by the provision of appointment 
which would allow it to be reviewed and, if need be, renew the matured contract without 
questioning the permanent sovereignty of the host state. 
Obviously, further regulations are needed to improve the balance between 
investor and state interests. 
C Proposal of a Dynamic Harmonisation of International Investment Law 
 
The International Institute of Sustainable Development has developed a model of 
an International Agreement Investment for Sustainable Development 481  aiming in 
particular at trying to bring an adequate answer to the issue arising from the necessity of 
adaptating public policies related to environment and sustainable development,482 as well 
as a necessary integration of these concerns into the reasoning and the behavior of foreign 
investors. Also the model of the IISD attempts to solve the question of the wording of a 
solution to the issue of the conflict between a regulatory measure of a state and 
conflicting rights of foreign investors identified above.483 Lastly, it seeks to bring treat 
the underlying issue of vague attempts of sovereign strengthening.484 
The International Institute of Sustainable Development has drafted an IIA after 
several years of preliminary work, research, consultations and presentations to a council 
of experts.485 The extent of this model is of course broader than the subject of the present 
dissertation. 
The model is designed to constitute the standard for the signature of future 
IIAs.486 It is different from existing bilateral agreements, in particular in how it reviews 
the respective positions of the three major parties which are the investor, the host state 
and the country of origin. 
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Basically, the model of agreement of the IISD has, as a higher objective, to allow 
the harmonious combination of an international protected investment (but accountable) 
with a sustainable development for areas of origin and reception of international 
investments. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to briefly describe the main 
provisions of the model, then to analyse what this model does not deal with and to 
conclude with a recommendation for decision makers and scholars of a conceptual 
alternative intended to address certain lacunae and drawbacks of the current basis of IIAs. 
 
1 The all-embracing and innovative approach of the IISD 
 
(a) Brief summary of the model of IIA suggested by the IISD 
 
The model of agreement suggested by the IISD is a multilateral agreement: it 
considers the situation of the foreign investor as well as the situation of the host state and 
of the country of origin, which is innovative, in particular as regards the involvement of 
the latter.487 
This model includes definitions of major concepts (act of investment, actors of the 
agreement…). 488  In addition, it states the principles of security, also major for 
international investment. The suggested IIA supports the requirement of a sustainable 
development, in the North as well as in the South,489 by not omitting the social facet of 
the international investment; the encouragement of a protected international investment 
and the balance that needs to exist between the rights and obligations of the three main 
actors of international investment (investor, host and home states).490 
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In addition, the model of the IISD presents a formal procedure of good 
governance,491 as well as a procedure of resolution of litigations that might occur.492 This 
procedure considers, in an original way, the creation of ad hoc institutions.493 
 
(b) Analysis of what the model of IIA of the IISD does not consider 
 
With regard to the possible reluctance of certain states to ratify whole or part of 
the elaborated model, the IISD is silent about the possibility of a partial ratification of the 
model of agreement. The model develops a whole concept which appears to have to be 
accepted as such. It does not include a hierarchy with the stated articles. A shortened 
version is not considered, or even a version including options for drafting. Thus, there is 
not a “Plan B”. A state’s choice is reduced, a priori, to the binary choice of complete 
membership to the presented model or complete rejection. In order to mitigate this major 
disadvantage, a simplified conceptual alternative is presented further in section 2. 
As for the principles of security of international investment, Articles 5, 6, 7 and 
21 of the model of agreement respectively deal with the national treatment of the 
investment, the most-favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment of the 
investment and the prohibition to expropriate without prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. 
Article 19 does not retain, for its part, the protection offered by the umbrella 
provisions. The explanation for this choice is provided in the Negotiator’s Handbook 
coming with the model of agreement. The authors specify that:494  
 
Rather, the obligations on host states are made specific and, we hope, clear. IISD 
believes it is inappropriate to grant to an international Dispute Settlement Body full 
jurisdiction to hear any type of complaint for breach of contract, or breach of a permit, 
etc. as a direct breach of an international agreement through the umbrella provision. We 
thus suggest that this type of provision not be included among the host state obligations. 
                                                 
491
 Aaron Cosbey, Howard Mann, Luke Eric Peterson and Konrad Von Moltke Model International 
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, above n 375, Article 15. 
492Ibid, Part 8: Institutions. 
493
 Ibid, Part 9: Dispute Prevention and Settlement. 
494
 Aaron Cosbey, Howard Mann, Luke Eric Peterson and Konrad Von Moltke IISD Model International 
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, Negociator’s Hanbook (2ed, IISD, Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, 2006) 33. 
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It is noted that Article 2 of the model of agreement approaches only in a generic 
way, and thus imperfectly, the scope of investments:495 “tangible property, including real 
property; and intangible property, including rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and 
pledges on real property.” However, what constitutes a major part of the present and 
future of the investments of companies, namely intellectual property (trademarks, patents, 
software and so on) is missing. 
Even if this is a relatively narrow area of law, it has featured a lot of disputes496 
and litigation 497  which could have justified an attempt to explicitly mention and 
incorporate it within the framework of work of the IISD. 
Is it useful to point out the interest of such an explicit mention taking into 
consideration the obligations and rights of the host states and countries of origin bound 
by the IIA? The proposal which follows intends to include this matter in a universal way. 
 
2 New key issues on investor-state relationship 
 
In order to adequately address some of the issues identified above, it this 
dissertation suggests the insertion in the preamble of international agreements on 
investments of a series of paragraphs relating to the right to security of international 
investments, under conditions. 
The preamble of IIAs is very important. The IISD refers to it in its model of 
agreement, taking into consideration the goals of the negotiation of the agreement. In 
addition, the IISD deliberately notes (in the comment in the Negotiator’s Guide) that the 
preamble often makes it possible to guide interpretation by the parties and the other 
people affected by the agreement of investment, including within the framework of the 
                                                 
495
 Ibid, Article 2, C, IV. 
496
 Thus the patentability of softwares gave rise to interesting debates at the European commission as from 
2003 with the preparation of a draft for adopting a directive promoting the recognition of the right to 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions but finally lead to a negative vote of the European 
Parliament in 2005:  see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=CEF478A13FD0F7E22BE3442A11E0C1E4.no
de1?language=EN&pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+DN-20050706-1+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last 
accessed 10 February 2009). 
497
 See Helnan International Hotels A/S v Arab Republic of Egypt (2008) (Award) ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/09, paras 78 and following at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_helnan.pdf (last accessed 10 February 
2009). 
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settlement of disputes. Several arbitrations concerning international investment have been 
concerned with provisions contained in the preamble.498  
While failing to establish the heavy (but tempting) architecture of the model of 
IIA proposed by the IISD, it is interesting to think of the inclusion of a frame-system that 
would constitute the right counterpart to the formal recognition of the right of security of 
international investments in the preamble of every IIA. 
 
Such a new form of preamble might state: 
 
“The fundamental rights (national treatment of the investment, the most-favoured 
nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment of the investment, prohibition to 
expropriate without prompt, adequate and effective compensation, the possibility of 
transferring credits) of the security of international investors are guaranteed by this 
agreement: 
-  in return for which the respect, in good faith, of obligatory liabilities, as well as 
values and obligations such as defined or quoted by (or “to which refer”) texts clarifying 
the activity of international organisations or institutions (UN, UNESCO, OECD, WTO, 
ILO, EU, ECHR…) in the geographical or operational field of which any recipient of the 
present agreement acts or joins the above listed organisations; such responsibilities, 
values and obligations are recognised and accepted as constituting the general framework 
of intervention of all the recipients to the agreement, 
-  and except prevailing requirement of public interest.” 
 
 The above approach would have certain attributes and advantages. The 
importance of the protection of investments is stated from the outset. Moreover, reference 
is made to “obligatory responsibilities” which must be respected. By this expression, the 
project intends to answer the mentions of the risks that investors have to face, but also the 
internationally practiced and shared legal provisions (for example the “responsibility of 
the manufacturer”). Values and obligations to respect are mentioned and are contained in 
                                                 
498
 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd & MTD Chile SA v Republic of Chile, above n 469, para 113. 
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a corpus of rules relating to the operation and the activity - in perpetual evolution – of 
international agencies of reference and with normative goals. Explicit mention is made of 
the requirement that the participants act bona fide. A non-constraining reference is made 
to international agencies. It is completely possible to limit the list. The “recipients” of the 
agreement are pointed out. Therefore in a generally accepted meaning it refers to any 
person or organization who has a legitimate interest in the investment and the 
international agreement. Finally, the introduction of a reference to respect for the 
“prevailing requirement of public interest” is included. This concept results from the 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 499  It is inspired by the 
concern of prevailing law and order, according to the reason that the general interest (for 
example the common good) must prevail over private interests. This is concerned with 
the commission of offences and the protection of the security and essential interests of the 
host state. One could, for simplification, imagine another formulation: “except in the 
event of commission of offences whose nature and particular gravity are likely to be 
criminally punished.” 
Such a proposal is intended to act as an intermediary between the various drafts of 
existing bilateral agreements and the – still incomplete – very structured draft project of 
the IISD. 
The essence is to try to develop the matter, by proposing a general provision 
which focuses on the symmetrical aspect of the rights and obligations of the various 
recipients. Therefore, the present proposal appears to constitute an honest compromise 
making possible to frame the draft in relation to the constant evolution of new 
international investment agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
499
 See in particular the case Roemen and Schmit v Luxembourg (Judgement) ECHR (Fourth Section) (no. 
51772/99) (25 February 2003) para 46: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166
DEA398649&key=3538&sessionId=16338131&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true (last accessed 16 
February 2009). 
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CHAPTER V  CONCLUSION 
 
The comprehensive analysis of the foreign investor-host state conflicting rapport 
and highlighted in Chapter III clearly demonstrates a lack of balance in most of 
international investment agreements today. Such treaties have a tendency to focus 
exclusively on foreign investor rights and protection. In addition, there is no frequent 
space for provision of the right of host states to take regulatory measures in order to 
achieve public policy or development objectives. One can only but notice that such an 
unbalanced relationship between the main actors of an investment treaty involves some 
negative consequences for developing countries. Certainly, we have reached a high 
number of over 250 known arbitrations mainly brought by investors against host states. A 
great number of awards result in imposing excessive financial costs to developing 
country governments which cannot in turn implement their regulatory policies. In this 
manner, an American lawyer describes investment agreements as:500 
 
an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a financial or business 
failure was due to improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic policy or 
discriminatory treatment by the host government and delighted by the opportunity to 
threaten the national government with a tedious expensive arbitration 
 
Answering the most fundamental question of what level of protection is needed to 
ensure a proper balance between legitimate rights of investors and public interest of host 
states requires advocating for several practical solutions.  
The main requirement is dealing with both public policy requirements and to new 
obligations from international investment law, the state would have to adapt its decision-
making procedures to increase transparency. Thus, for a public policy required to be 
spotless with respect to international investment law, it could be useful for the state to 
establish a unique organ to take responsibility for an initial consultation with investors 
before the final decision. This would avoid a policy newly instituted by the authorities of 
a host state infringing legitimate expectations of a foreign investor. These expectations 
have recently become the central notion of the security of international investments. 
                                                 
500
 William D. Rogers “Inter-American Development Bank Conference on Commercial Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in the XXI Century: The Road Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean” Speech to Inter-
American Bank Conference, 26-27 October 2000) 2. 
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 Insofar as it encourages extensive reform of the administration of host countries, 
international investment law can appear to be a trouble-maker. Nevertheless, these new 
developments encourage transparency, institutional development and therefore the 
credibility of the public management of host states. These elements promote 
competitiveness and the sustainable development of economies which benefit from it. If 
they are made in a constructive way, adaptations to the evolution of international 
investment law might simultaneously serve the foreign investor and the general interest. 
International security of investments therefore is inextricably linked to an inevitable 
transformation of the state where domestic tools become insufficient in many respects.  
 The International Institute for Sustainable Development Model Investment Treaty 
provides interesting and original alternative provisions. However, such a multilateral 
model of investment treaty remains an indicator of the evolution of this area of law and at 
the moment is not binding.  
Since this model is not in force, it might be found other realistic ways of ensuring 
a better balancing of the rights and interests of foreign investors and respect for legitimate 
public concerns.501 In negotiating new IIAs or revising their current ones, countries need 
to legitimately consider new concerns such as environment and social issues. One way of 
doing so is for states to clarify uncertain legal terms where interpretation provided by 
tribunals might be inconsistent such as ‘foreign investor’, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
or ‘indirect expropriation.’ New BITs may also precise that certain environmental or 
public security measures do not amount to indirect expropriation. 502  Lastly, another 
tempting way would be to include the right to security of international investments as a 
general provision in preambles of IIAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
501
 UN CTAD “Balancing Private and Public Interests in International Investments IAs” UNCTAD Expert 
Meeting on Development Implications of International Investment Rule Making (28-29 June 2007) 6. 
502
 See the 2004 US Model BIT, above n 326, Annex B. 
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